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who always helped me up when I got lost in the data. And without a well functioning
computer empirical research is impossible, therefore I have to thank Stefan Schmid for
ensuring that my computer worked well throughout my whole assistance time.
v
Preface
I would like to thank my parents, Urs and Ursula, for their great support and for
providing me with the opportunity to invest so much time in my studies. Finally I would
like to thank Serena Simeone and Eric Périsset for their assistance whenever the going
got rough.
During the hard time of writing this thesis, I also experienced light and hope with the
birth of my nice Sereine – definitely proving that economics is not the center of life.




”Unter Arbeitskraft oder Arbeitsvermögen verstehen wir den Inbegriff der
physischen und geistigen Fähigkeiten, die in der Leiblichkeit, der lebendigen
Persönlichkeit eines Menschen existieren und die er in Bewegung setzt, so oft
er Gebrauchswerte irgendeiner Art produziert.”
Karl Marx (1818-1883), ”Das Kapital” (1872: p 148)
Most people in industrialized countries depend on the wage they earn in return for provid-
ing their physical or intellectual abilities. A substantial portion of individuals’ available
time is spent either as a part of the active workforce or in the educational system as a pre-
stage of their future working life. The labor market circumscribes the complex interplay
between the labor supply of employees and the labor demand of employers. It is the task
of labor economists to try to understand the forces and dynamics underlying the labor
market. Econometrics is one important tool which helps labor economists to comprehend
the labor market. Yet in order to use econometric techniques the labor economist depends
on the availability of data. This thesis is conceived as a contribution to the literature on
empirical labor economics.
Employment is more than simply a contract between the employer and the employee
setting the work conditions, the working hours or the wage. Beside the wage and the
work time, employment involves several other positive and negative aspects. Many social
interactions, which lead to new social contacts takes place at the workplace. Social ex-
changes at the workplace affect the behavior of employees and their job satisfaction (Seers
et al., 1995). The individual disadvantage of being unemployed compared with being em-
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ployed is more than the monetary cost of receiving an unemployment benefit beneath ones
earned income. Unemployment has an additional significant negative effect on individual
happiness and life satisfaction (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998; Lucas et al., 2002).
Beside these various positive aspects, employment also involves certain risks. Some risks
directly affect the health of workers, such as the risk of an injury or occupational disease,
other risks have indirect effects on individuals’ well being, for example the risk of losing
one’s job.
This thesis will focus on two such risks, namely the risk of getting displaced due to a
plant closure and the accident risk. More precisely, chapter 2 focuses on earnings losses
of displaced workers and the question of whether the losses due to a plant closure depend
on the size of the former employer and the business cycle. Chapter 3 and 4 focus on
compensating wage differentials, for accident risk. Chapter 3 separates observed wages
and risks into a worker and a firm specific wage and risk component. We thereby isolate
the building block of the theory on compensation wage differentials, the firm specific wage
and risk component. Chapter 4 provides estimates for the value of a statistical accident.
We minimize the ”ability bias” pointed out by Hwang et al. (1992) by focusing on workers
of the lowest skill level.
1.1 Involuntary Job Losses
The termination of an employment relationship can have different reasons. From the
point of view of the worker the termination may be voluntary or involuntary. A worker
usually quits his job on his own initiative, because he has found a more desirable job. But
there may be other reasons for a voluntary termination of employment, such as a move
to another city or country, change of family situation or early retirement. A worker can
suffer from being involuntarily laid-off because he is not productive enough. In such a
case a worker can influence his risk of being laid-off through his own performance. But,
even a worker with a high productivity can involuntarily lose his job for reasons beyond
his control by being victim to a plant closure or a reorganization of his firm. In such a
situation a worker has nearly no possibilities to prevent his displacement.
For a long time labor economists have been concerned with the issue of workers losing
their jobs due to structural economic shocks, e.g. trade liberalization, government regu-
lations or technological changes. When a firm goes bankrupt all workers lose their jobs,
independent of their productivity, their position or their labor market history. Neverthe-
less, empirical studies show that some workers have a higher risk of losing their jobs due
to a plant closure than others. For example in the U.S., Canada and the U.K. displace-
ment rates tend to be higher for men than for women. In Denmark there is no difference
between men and women and in Belgium women are more likely to get displaced than
2
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men. In most countries younger workers have a higher displacement rate than older work-
ers (for a survey see Kuhn, 2002). Schwerdt (2005) points out that some workers leave
the firm before the plant closure and he shows that these ”early leavers” have higher
re-employment chances than the workers who stay with their employer until bankruptcy.
A large part of the economic literature on displaced workers focuses on workers’ earn-
ings losses after displacement. Using widely differing empirical methods and sources of
data, many empirical studies agree that workers suffer lasting ”scars” following a plant
closure (e.g. Ruhm, 1991; Stevens, 1997; Farber, 1996). In Pennsylvania, for example,
displaced workers suffer from long-term earnings losses of 25% per year. The pattern
of the losses of workers displaced from firms with 50 to 500 employees is similar to the
pattern of workers displaced from firms with 2,000 to 5,000 employees. The losses are
larger for workers displaced from firms in the heavily unionized mining and construction
industry. Also, the local labor market conditions affect the earnings losses of displaced
workers. Workers’ losses increase when the workers are displaced in regions with weaker
labor markets conditions (for the Pennsylvanian case see Jacobson et al., 1993). Gibbons
and Katz (1991) shed light on another aspect of plant closure. The authors put forth that
when the employer can decide which worker he wants to lay off, the market infers that
these laid-off workers are of low productivity. In contrast to laid-off workers, those losing
their jobs due to a plant closure are given no such negative label, because there is little
to no connection between their productivity and the plant closure.
I argue that when the firm is small enough and the economic situation in which a
displaced worker seeks employment is a boom period (where the plant closure is unlikely
to be caused solely by aggravating market conditions) the labor market will infer that
this displaced worker is less productive. Chapter 2 analyzes the labor market success
of workers who are displaced in boom versus recession periods. Further, the empirical
analysis contrasts workers from small firms versus large firms. Again, the idea is that
displacement carries no information about workers’ productivity in large firms but is a
signal of low productivity for workers from small firms. This negative signal is worse when
the plant closure occurs at the beginning of a longer boom period than at the beginning
of a longer recession period. Results show that (i) the state of the business cycle has an
important influence on the effect of displacement on labor market success and (ii) that
this effect differs depending on the size of the former employer. In large firms, displaced
workers suffer from larger earnings losses when displacement occurs during a recession as
compared to during a boom; the opposite result holds for workers displaced from small
firms.
3
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1.2 Compensating Wage Differentials
More than 200 years ago, Adam Smith (1776) pointed out that ”The wages of labour
vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, and the honourableness or
dishonourableness of the employment”. Since then labor economists have tried in different
ways to quantify the relationship between such negative or positive job aspects and the
wage the firm pays their workers. Empirical studies abound, which estimate compensating
wage differentials for various workplace risks. For example in the U.S. agriculture sector,
seasonal workers are compensated for their higher risk of unemployment by earning on
average 15% more than permanent workers (Moretti, 2000). Hersch (1998) finds for the
U.S. that a female worker, working on a job where she is exposed to an average level of
job risk, receives a wage premium of $400-$563 per year as compensation for non fatal
workplace risk. Using the estimated compensating wage differential for non fatal injury
risk, the value of a statistical accident can easily be computed. The literature provides
very different estimates of the value of a statistical accident, depending on various aspects,
for example the estimation method, the underlying economic situation or the data quality.
The estimates of the value of a statistical accident in the U.S. labor market range from
$20,000 to $70,000. There is little evidence from outside the United States, but most of
the European estimates falls within the U.S. range (see Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). The
evidence on the quantitative impact of injury risks on the compensation of workers is still
in debate. One main reason for the fact that many issues remain unsolved is the limited
availability of data. While most authors have typically used longitudinal data sets for
individual workers, information about the firm is mostly absent or extremely scarce in
such data sets. However, firm information is of crucial importance from a theoretical
point of view, as it is a characteristic of the workplace (rather than the worker) that leads
to differences in wages.
Chapter 3 uses linked firm-worker data to study how workplace injury risks affect
wages and the sorting of workers into different workplaces. Our analysis contributes
to existing research by using data that reports, for the individual worker, incidences of
workplace injuries together with the worker’s complete earnings and employment history.
Moreover, the data set allows us to link firms and workers, allowing us to identify the
building blocks of the theory of compensating differentials: the wages and the risks that
are specific to the firm. Furthermore, as we can also identify wages and risks attached
to the worker, we can shed new light on the issue of how workers sort themselves across
workplaces with different injury risks. To disentangle observed wages and workplace
injuries into a component that is attached to the worker and a component that is particular
to the firm, we borrow the econometric techniques developed by Abowd et al. (2002).
The main results are: (i) The compensating differential (estimated from a regression
of the firm-wage component on the firm-risk component) is roughly equal to the one
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obtained in the cross-sectional hedonic wage regression. (ii) We do not find evidence
that more productive workers sort themselves into more secure jobs. (iii) However, our
results indicate that high-risk workers select themselves into high-wage jobs suggesting
that workers who are willing to take high injury risks are more likely to accept other
workplace disamenities (and get compensated for them).
As a Swiss labor economist, I am especially motivated to contribute to the literature on
the Swiss labor market. Chapter 4 deals with the compensation for non–fatal accident risk
in Switzerland and presents empirical estimates of the value of a statistical injury by using
data from the Swiss Wage Structure Survey (SWSS) and the Swiss Accident Insurance
Fund (SAIF). The main problem of concern in our analysis is that there presumably is
endogenous sorting of workers into jobs with different accident risks based on unobserved
differences in productivity. Such kind of endogenous sorting leads to inconsistent estimates
of the compensating wage differential. We approach this problem in two ways. First,
having access to the number of accidents not only at the level of industries, but also within
cells defined over industry×skill–level of the jobs, allows us to estimate risk compensation
within groups of workers defined over these cells. Second, we capitalize on the partial
panel structure of the SWSS, which includes longitudinal information with respect to
the employer. This principally allows for the empirical isolation of the wage component
specific to the employer. This is of central importance since the theory of compensating
wage differentials essentially relates to the firm–specific component of the wage, but not
necessarily to the observed wage (or the wage component specific to the worker). These
different approaches to identification yield in fact very different estimates of the value of
a statistical injury. Our preferred estimate corresponds to about 40,000 Swiss Francs (per
prevented injury per year), an estimate which actually lies within the range of estimates
given by studies for the U.S. labor market. The results of our research on this topic also
shed some light on the problem of endogenous sorting of workers.
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CHAPTER 2
Effects of Firm Size and Business Cycle
on Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers
”Capitalism without bankruptcy
is like Christianity without hell.”
Frank Borman, retired NASA astronaut
2.1 Introduction
All of Switzerland was paralyzed by the grounding of Swissair, our national airline. We
were shorn of the illusion that the white cross on the logo of our airline stood for stability
and security. Nearly everyone around Zurich knows someone who was affected by the
grounding of Swissair. Fortunately the government and the economy reacted, for Swiss
circumstances, very rapidly by providing billions to build up a new airline out of the
remains of Swissair. In doing so further negative consequences could be avoided, such as
the potential demise of many intermediate firms dependent on Swissair.
For decades, economists and politicians alike have concerned themselves with the
problem of workers loosing their jobs due to events beyond their control. Displaced
workers suffer substantial earnings losses after a plant closure (e.g. Flaim and Sehgal,
1985; Hamermesh, 1989; Addison and Portugal, 1989; Ruhm, 1991). Because of the loss
of firm-specific human capital, internal wages lie above alternative wages (Hamermesh,
1987). The earnings losses of displaced workers even hold in the long run (Jacobson et al.,
1993; Stevens, 1997). Contrary to workers who have been laid-off, a worker’s displacement
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does not signal that he is less productive. Displaced workers have higher re-employment
wages and shorter unemployment spells than laid-off workers (Gibbons and Katz, 1991).
The idea behind this signaling hypothesis is that an individual worker is unlikely to have
contributed to a plant closure, whereas being laid off is seen as a sign of low productivity.
This chapter proposes that the individual contribution to a plant closure and thus the
signal about a worker’s productivity is not necessarily insignificant and it depends on the
size of the former employer and the business cycle. In general, this chapter argues first,
that the probability that a plant closure is driven by a negative demand shock is larger
in recessions than in booms and second, that firm performance is closely related to the
effort exerted by an individual worker in small firms but not in large firms. Consider
an economy with a asymmetric flow of information, where the workers’ productivity is
not observable to the employer. A new employer of a displaced worker would have no
information about this workers’ productivity besides the fact that his previous employer
has closed down. Consider furthermore that this worker’s previous firm was a one-man
company that went bankrupt in an economic environment which was steadily improving.
In this extreme example it seems natural that the individual contribution of this single
worker to the plant closure cannot be ignored from the labor market. The question is:
what does the new employer learn about the productivity of the worker, when his only
information is that the worker’s previous firm has gone bankrupt? This chapter argues
that when a worker who was displaced from a small firm is looking for a new job in a boom
period, the new employer infers that the worker is of low productivity. Workers displaced
from a large firm or during a recession period do not carry such a negative signal.
The empirical analysis will contrast earnings losses for workers displaced in a boom
from workers displaced in a recession and furthermore distinguish between workers dis-
placed from small firms and large firms. This chapter will use workers who have been
displaced from large firms as a benchmark, where individuals’ contribution to the plant
closure and thus the signal on workers productivity is almost zero. Because re-employment
real wages are lower in a recession than in a boom (Dunlop, 1938; Tarshis, 1939; Baker
et al., 1994; Barlevy, 2001), workers getting displaced from large firms should suffer larger
earnings losses when the plant closure occurs in a recession than in a boom. This ar-
gument also applies to small firms. In addition, workers who have been displaced from
small firms also carry a negative signal because they would have had more influence on
the success of the firm. One would expect that this negative signal should be worse in a
boom than in a recession and thus induce larger earnings losses when the plant closure
occurs in a boom. The net effect of the business cycle on future earnings for workers
getting displaced from small firms is ambiguous.
The empirical analysis is based on a large administrative data set covering all Austrian
private sector workers and their quarterly (un)-employment and earnings history from
1972 to 2001. A unique feature of the data is that by observing the size of the firm over
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time the exact date of each plant closure can be determined, this allowing one to compare
earnings losses of workers displaced in a boom with workers displaced in a recession.
Additionally, plant closing is observed at the firm level, which allows one to contrast large
plant closure firms from small plant closure firms.
The main results of this chapter are, first, that workers getting displaced from large
firms suffer larger earnings losses when they get displaced at the beginning of a recession
period rather than at the beginning of a boom period. Separating the earnings effects
into a wage and an unemployment effect results indicate that the probability of finding a
new job after displacement is larger in a boom than in a recession. Wages are, however,
not affected. Thus the large earnings losses in the recession period are driven by the
accordingly larger fraction of unemployed displaced workers. These findings for workers
displaced from large firms holds true during the entire post-displacement time period of six
years. Second, workers who have been displaced from small firms experience significantly
higher declines in earnings when they lose their job at the beginning of a boom period.
This is in contrast to the findings for the large firms. Differences in the earnings losses
between boom and recession are largely driven by the wages. Workers displaced from
small firms suffer substantially larger declines in wages when the plant closure occurs at
the beginning of a boom period. The probability of finding a new job after displacement
is hardly affected by the business cycle. Third, there are no significant differences in
pre-displacement earnings between boom and recession, neither for large firms nor for
small firms. Thus the difference findings for the earnings losses during a boom versus a
recession are not driven by ex-ante heterogeneity of workers and firms.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 gives a short overview of related
literature. Section 2.3 presents the data source and defines the sample of plant closure
workers and the control sample of non plant closure workers respectively. Further, this
section gives a short descriptive comparison of the earnings losses during a boom versus
a recession, separately for workers displaced from large firms and workers displaced from
small firms. Section 2.4 introduces different measures to capture the losses due to a plant
closure and presents the statistical models used in this chapter. The results are shown
and discussed in section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
There are many studies analyzing long-term earnings losses of displaced workers. One
of the most exhaustive studies is one from Jacobson et al. (1993). The authors use
longitudinal data containing quarterly earnings histories for a large number of high tenure
displaced and non-displaced workers from Pennsylvania, extending from 1974 to 1986.
The authors find significant long-term earnings losses for the five years following the plant
closure for high tenure workers. Further, they find that the earnings losses of displaced
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workers begin mounting before their displacement and depends only minimally on their
age and sex. Jacobson et al. (1993) also find strong evidence that the earnings losses
depend on the local labor market conditions. Workers displaced in a region with weak
labor market conditions suffer higher earnings losses than workers displaced in a region
with better labor market conditions. Stevens (1997) finds for the U.S. , in connection with
a national data set based on a survey, that even six or more years after the plant closure
displaced workers’ earnings lie significantly below their expected levels. Further, she shows
that a big part of these earnings losses can be explained by additional job losses following
an initial displacement. Bender et al. (2002) compare, among other things, the wage
profile of displaced workers after their job loss with the wages they earned right before
the plant closure, using French and German data. In Germany, displaced workers earn
significantly less in the three years after the plant closure but the earnings loss becomes
insignificant after four years. In France, displaced workers earn even more in the first
three years after the plant closure than directly before the plant closure. One explanation
could be that high-wage workers find a new job earlier. The earnings difference becomes
insignificant after four years as well. Thus, in contrast to the results from Jacobson et al.
(1993) the earnings losses in France and Germany disappear in the long run. The reason
for this may be the much more regulated labor markets in France and Germany, compared
to in the United States.
Gibbons and Katz (1991) offer another approach by comparing the labor market
success of plant closure workers with laid-off workers. They provide a theoretical and an
empirical analysis of an asymmetric information model of layoffs. The idea behind their
paper is that employers have private information concerning their employees’ productivity
and they are able to choose who to lay off. Accordingly, the market infers that laid-off
workers are of low productivity and offers them lower wages in their next job. In other
words, laid-off workers carry a negative signal concerning their productivity. The authors
assume that workers displaced by a plant closure, in contrast, carry no signal concerning
to their productivity, because the worker’s individual contribution to the plant closure
of a firm is negligible. Therefore the authors predict higher re-employment wages for
plant closure workers than for laid-off worker. They confirm this prediction using the
1984-1986 Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) as a supplement of the Current Population
Survey (CPS).
There is further literature which analysis either the effect of the business cycle or the
effect of the size of the former employer. While not distinguishing between small firms and
large firms, Nakamura (2004) develops a theoretical model in which displacement arises
from a combination of selection and bad luck. The idea is that in every period some
workers get laid off due to their low productivity, while the number of laid off workers due
to bad luck would be higher during a recession. The proportion of workers who are laid
off due to their low productivity would thus be larger during a boom. This implies that
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workers who get laid off in a recession are, on average, less adversely selected than those
laid off during a boom. If the productivity of a worker is not observable to employers
and the signaling effect varies over time, wage losses should also vary over time. Using
the DWS as a supplement to the CPS she finds that the overall unemployment rate at
the time of the job displacement has a significant positive effect on individuals’ earnings
losses. Farber (2005) also finds strong evidence that earnings losses of displaced workers
are pro-cyclical to the business cycle. Also using the DWS and the CPS he finds earnings
losses of about 7% during a recession as opposed to earnings losses of about 17% during a
boom. Winter-Ebmer (2001) shows, using a large Austrian administrative data set, that
larger firms not only pay higher wages but also offer more stable employment conditions.
Krashinsky (2002) shows, using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, that the
difference between earnings losses of laid off workers compared with those of displaced
workers found by Gibbons and Katz (1991) becomes insignificant after controlling for the
size of the former and the new employer.
Farber (1996), Kletzer (1998) and Abbring et al. (2002) investigate the effect of the
business cycle on the displacement rate. For displaced workers, defined as permanent
layoffs, the displacement rate is more or less anti-cyclical to the business cycle. The
displacement rate, which includes only those workers displaced due to a plant closure,
shows little variation over time.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
2.3.1 Data
The data source for the empirical analysis in this chapter is the ”Austrian Social Security
Database” (ASSD1), which contains detailed information about individuals’ employment–
unemployment– and earnings–history and several demographic characteristics such as
age, gender, and broad occupation. The ASSD also contains detailed information on the
employer, such as the size of the firm, the geographical location and the industry affiliation.
The data set is unique in the following respects: first, one can exactly determine the date
of a plant closure and thus precisely analyze workers’ earnings losses over time. Second,
one can observe plant closure at the firm level, allowing one to distinguish between small
firms and large firms. This allows one to also control for firm specific characteristics in
addition to individual worker’s characteristics.
Individual earnings are available as earned income per workday. Earnings are mea-
sured in Euro and deflated by the consumer price index from 1986. For the purposes of
this study, the 10th of February, May, August and November were used as quarter refer-
1For a detailed description of the ASSD see Kuhn and Ruf (2006)
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ence dates2. Because the data was originally collected for Social Security purposes, there
are also some disadvantages. The available earnings are right censored; about 15% of the
workers have earnings above the upper censoring level, which varies over time. The data
also does not contain any information about full or part time employment. However, the
focus of this chapter is on income. The censoring may be problem. Yet, because workers
suffer an earnings loss due to the plant closure, the fraction of censored wages will be
larger in the group of non plant closure workers. This means the differences between the
earnings of the plant closure (PC) workers and the non plant closure (NPC) workers will
be attenuated due to the censored earnings.
The ASSD contains no direct information about plant closures. Yet, they can be
constructed by analyzing the size of companies over time. A company is defined as a
plant closure firm at the reference date t when two conditions are satisfied: (i) the firm
disappears3 between the reference dates t and t + 1 and does not re-emerge during the
following year4 (ii) and less than 50% of the employees of a company find a new job with
the same new employer. The latter criterion makes sure that company acquisitions are not
erroneously classified as plant closures. In this chapter a worker counts as a PC worker
at time t when he still works in the plant that goes bankrupt within the next quarter.
That is, all PC workers will be displaced5 within the next three months.
2.3.2 Sample Design
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the effect of job displacement on the future wage
profile of displaced workers at two different points in the business cycle. Figure 2.1 shows
the yearly growth rates of the real GDP (solid line) and the unemployment rates (dashed
line), which are used as indicators for the business cycle.
As discussed in the introduction, the two points in time should be selected such that
in one of them the economic situation steadily improves and in the other the economic
conditions continuously deteriorate. In the statistical analyses, both a boom and a re-
cession is made up of a period of eight consecutive quarters. The period 1987/1988 is
followed by 5 years with relatively low unemployment rates (below 6%) and growth rates
of the real GDP above 2%. This point in time, which is followed by a period where the
economy expands relatively rapidly, is selected as the boom period. The period 1991/1992
is followed by six years with unemployment rates above 6%, and four years with growth
rates of the real GDP below 2%6. This time period with relatively higher unemployment
2This setup implies that the data includes only information of the according reference dates.
3A firm disappears from the data, if it has no employees between t and t + 1.
4This condition is set to one year, because the firm numbers were assigned anew after two years. That
is, under the same firm number a completely new firm may emerge after two years.
5I will use plant closure and displacement as synonyms in this chapter.
6Expect for the year 1994, where the growth rate of the real GDP amounts to 2.4%.
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rates and a more slowly expanding economy is selected as the recession period. Therefore
by comparing the earnings losses between the years following the plant closure, a typical
boom period is compared with a typical recession period. For each of these points in time
a sample of workers is generated. Each of these samples contains all the workers who
were employed at least at one quarter reference date in the according time period. The
workers are split up in PC workers and NPC workers. The group of PC workers contains
workers who were employed at least at one of the eight quarter reference dates in a plant
closure firm. The group of NPC workers, used as the control group, contains workers who
have never been employed in a plant closure firm during the same time period.
The data set includes the quarterly earning profile of each worker over six pre- and
six post-displacement years for both points in time. To ensure that most of the workers
exhibit earnings during this period and to avoid the problem of early retirement7, the
samples are restricted to prime-age workers aged 25-48. To compare the group of workers
between the two points in time, the workers should have comparable costs of displacement.
Workers who often change their firms and thus are used to being unemployed and looking
for a new job would be less affected by an unexpected job loss than attached workers
who want to keep their job. Furthermore, workers who leave a distressed firm before the
7In the ASSD we observe early retirement already for 55 years old worker.
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Table 2.1: Number of displaced workers by the size of their company
Size of firm Number of PC workers
boom recession
1 - 4 5’977 (5’203) 6’082 (5’337)
5 - 9 1’035 (472) 1’144 (509)
10 - 19 582 (135) 621 (155)
20 - 49 449 (55) 466 (55)
50 - 99 167 (8) 223 (12)
100 - 199 119 (2) 13 (1)
200 - 499 40 (1) 0 (0)
500 - 999 0 (0) 145 (1)
1000 + 0 (0) 591 (1)
Notes: The values in parentheses correspond to the number of firms.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
bankruptcy is apparent, have different earning profiles than worker who stay until the
end (Bowlus and Vilhuber, 2002; Schwerdt, 2005). Accordingly, the sample is restricted
to attached workers, with at least two years of tenure. An additional advantage of this
restriction is that workers who are only seasonally unemployed are dropped too.8 In
addition, all observations without information about industry or region were excluded
from the sample.
Table 2.1 shows the number of PC workers who fullfill the restrictions discussed above,
listed according to the size of their firms. The numbers in parentheses correspond to the
number of the involved firms.9 Up to the size of firms with 100 employees the number
of PC workers does not differ much between boom and recession. But with the bigger
firms come larger differences. In order to have as few differences as possible between
boom and recession, firms with more than 100 employees were excluded. Further, the
employees should have comparable information about the future financial problems of
their company before the plant closure. The smaller a company the better would be the
employees’ information about the imminent bankruptcy of their employer. Thus, the large
group of firms with less than five employees is excluded from the samples. An other reason
why firms with less than five employees were excluded, is that it is difficult to identify a
plant closure for tiny firms. To analyze different earnings losses depend on the size of the
8In Austria there are a lot of seasonal workers. For example, in the constructing industry many workers
are disbanding in the unemployment during the winter because of the smaller volume of orders. For more
detailed information about seasonal workers and the restriction of two years of tenure see Ruf (2004).
9At first sight it’s confusing that in the firm in the group of 500 - 999 employees only 145 workers were
employed. At second sight, it gets clear that only 145 workers of this firm are aged 25-48 and have at
least two years of tenure.
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former employer, this article distinguishes between small firms, which employ between five
and nine workers, and large firms, which employ between ten and one hundred workers.
For the empirical analysis a 2% random sample of the NPC workers and all the PC
workers were used. After imposing all the restrictions mentioned in this section there
remain for the boom period: 1,035 (9,596) PC (NPC) workers in the sample of small
firms and 1,167 (37,933) in the sample of large firms. For the recession period: 1,144
(9,640) in the sample of small firms and 1,191 (39,198) in the sample of large firms
2.3.3 Descriptive Analysis
First, I calculate the average earning differences of the PC workers minus the NPC workers
for the six pre- and the six post-displacement years. The left subfigure of figure 2.2
shows the average differences for the large firms and the right column those for the small
firms. The differences in earnings are computed on the vertical axis and the years since
displacement on the horizontal axis. The solid lines correspond to the differences in the
boom period whereas the dashed lines correspond to those of the recession period.
In both points in time, workers displaced from large firms earn on average a little less
than the NPC workers during the six pre-displacement years. The differences are slightly
larger during a recession than during a boom. The PC workers suffer a large earnings
loss during the first years; subsequently the difference in earnings to the NPC workers
gets smaller over time. Workers displaced from large firms suffer larger earnings losses
over the whole post-displacement period when the plant closure occurs during a recession
than during a boom.
For workers displaced from small firms the differences in earnings between the PC
workers and the NPC workers is almost zero during the six pre-displacement years. The
path of the earnings losses in the post-displacement years appears similar to the results

































Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
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for the large firms. But in contrast to workers displaced from large firms, those displaced
from small firms suffer larger earnings losses over the whole post-displacement period when
the plant closure occurs during a boom than during a recession. Summed up, during a
recession workers suffer larger earnings losses, when they are displaced from large firms,
whereas during a boom the earnings losses are larger for workers displaced from small
firms.
Table 2.2 shows the average characteristics of workers and firms, for each group cor-
respondingly. There are only small differences between the average PC worker and the
average NPC worker. In all the samples PC workers are on average older than the NPC
workers; nevertheless PC workers are less attached to their firms. In the sample of small
firms, seasonal firms10 have a higher probability to go bankrupt at the beginning of a
boom period than non seasonal firms, whereas during a recession there is almost no such
difference. It is unclear, however, whether the ex ante heterogeneity of workers and firms
of the different groups are responsible for the differences found in this section. Therefore,
in the next section, regressions are made which control for these ex ante heterogeneities.
2.4 Identification and Statistical Models
The aim of this chapter is to determine if earnings losses due to a plant closure depend
on the size of the former employer and the business cycle. To analyze this question the
empirical part distinguishes four groups of workers: those who are (i) employed in large
firms during a recession, (ii) employed in large firms during a boom, (iii) employed in small
firms during a recession and (iv) employed in small firms during a boom. Subsection 2.4.1
discusses how earnings losses are identified. Subsection 2.4.2 presents separate regressions,
which, on the one hand, are used to estimate the earnings losses for the four groups and,
on the other hand, to estimate the differences in the earnings losses between boom and
recession periods, for large and small firms respectively.
2.4.1 Identification of the Losses due to Plant Closure
A decline in earnings may result from a combined effect of a decline in wages and a larger
probability to be unemployed. This means that a lower expected income for a group of
workers can be the result of a lower average wage and/or more unemployed workers with
zero income within this group. This can be written as follows:
Egt(earningi) = Egt(wagei|Ui = 0) · Egt(Ui = 0).
Here, earningi corresponds to the earning of individual i in a specific year before or after
displacement. Thus, Egt(earningi) corresponds to the expected earnings of a group of
10Seasonal firms includes the building industry and the tourist sector.
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workers g at time t. This expectation can be written as the product of the expected
wage of all employed workers of group g at time t Egt(wagei|Ui = 0) multiplied with the
expected probability to be employed within this group of workers Egt(Ui = 0). From here
onwards, the effect of the plant closure on the probability to be unemployed will be called
the unemployment probability (UP) effect and the effect on the wage, the wage effect.
For a change in expected wages there are two sources; a selection effect and a net wage
effect. The selection effect occurs because more productive workers with higher average
wages find a new job faster than less productive workers with lower wages. The net wage
effect reflects changes in the wage of a specific worker, wagei, relative to his average wage
of the two years prior to displacement wagei
11. This can be written as follows:
Egt(wagei|Ui = 0) = Egt(wagei|Ui = 0) + Egt(wagei − wagei|Ui = 0).
The variable wagei can be used as a proxy of productivity for this worker (which is not
observed in the ASSD). Changes in Egt(wagei|Ui = 0) are only induced by variations in
the composition of employed workers. This is termed the selection effect. Egt(wagei −
wagei|Ui = 0) captures the net wage decline for employed workers. This is the net wage
effect, which is unaffected by time invariant unobserved individual characteristics.
2.4.2 Statistical Models
It is not clear if the ex-ante heterogeneity between workers and their firms is responsible
for the observed differences in average earnings discussed in the descriptive part. To take
this into account, one can estimate the following linear regression model for each group
of workers with:
Wit = α+ (pci · yt)






iθ + ǫit (2.1)
where Wit corresponds to one of the variables discussed above. (i.e., earningsit, wagesit,
UPit, wagei or (wageit −wagei)). Earnings and wages are deflated by the average
12. pci
is a dummy variable taking on the value one for PC workers and zero otherwise. yt is
a vector of dummy variables representing the years since displacement (from six years
before to six years after displacement). The vector xit includes individual characteristics
like age, age squared, gender, tenure, tenure squared and a dummy variable for blue
collar workers in order to control for the ex-ante heterogeneity of workers. The vector
fit contains firm related characteristics like industry (two digit), size, size squared and
the location of the firm (nine different states, ”Bundesländer”) in order to control for the
11During this two years all the individuals are employed, because a tenure of at least two years is
required to be included in the sample.
12This means that the individual earnings/wages are divided by the average earnings/wages of all
workers at the reference date (i.e. year = 0).
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ex-ante heterogeneity of firms. The vector qit includes three dummy variables for each
quarter of the reference date where the according workers are defined as PC workers or
NPC workers; the first quarter is the base quarter and thus not included in the regression.
Finally, ǫit is an error term assumed to be independent of observed characteristics. The
time index t identifies the year since displacement and the index i refers to individuals.
The vector of primary interest is β, which captures the differences in the variable of
interest between PC workers and NPC workers over the observation period.
The focus of this chapter lies in the differences in the earnings losses between boom and
recession periods. To directly estimate this difference in difference (DiD) parameter and
to test whether they differ significantly from zero, the samples from boom and recession
periods are merged together and additional regressions are run for each variable of interest,
separately for the sample of small and large firms. The regression has the following form:
Wit = α+ (Ri · pci · yt)
′βR + (Ri · yt)
′γR + (Ri · xi)
′δR + (Ri · fi)
′ηR
+(Ri · qi)
′θR + (pci · yt)






iθ + ǫit (2.2)
Ri is a dummy variable taking on the value one for the recession and the value zero for the
boom. The DID parameter vector βR captures the additional earnings losses for workers
displaced during a recession compared with workers displaced during a boom.
2.5 Empirical Findings
The descriptive part showed that workers displaced from large firms suffer on average
a larger earnings loss when the displacement occurs during a recession than when it
occurs during a boom. The opposite is true for workers displaced from small firms.
However, these results may be driven by the ex-ante heterogeneity of workers or firms.
The advantage of the regression framework presented above is that it explicitly controls
for such heterogeneity among workers and firms. The estimation results for βR (and the
corresponding t-values) are shown in tables 2.3 and 2.413.
In order to better understand the DiD estimates, estimated first differences of all
outcome variables (β̂ in the regression given by specification 2.1) are presented as well.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 display the results graphically. The differences of each outcome vari-
able are displayed on the vertical axis and the years since displacement on the horizontal
axis. The year since displacement is marked with an asterisk, when the difference between
boom and recession is statistically significant on the 5% level. The left column of the sub-
figures shows the estimated differences for large firms and the right column those for small
firms. The solid line corresponds to the estimated differences from the recession period
and the dashed line to the estimated differences from the boom period. Each difference
13Full regression results are available from the author on request.
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Table 2.3: Difference in differences: earnings, UP and wages
Sample Large firms Small firms
Dep. Variable Earnings UP Wages Earnings UP Wages
Year -6 -0.013 0.07 % 0.005 -0.009 0.00 % -0.013
(1.62) (0.23) (0.78) (0.87) (0.01) (1.51)
Year -5 -0.003 0.58 % 0.006 -0.018 0.73 % -0.005
(0.36) (1.89) (0.90) (1.79) (2.05)* (0.63)
Year -4 -0.006 1.10 % -0.002 -0.027 -0.09 % -0.003
(0.77) (3.60)** (0.33) (2.68)** (0.25) (0.38)
Year -3 0.002 0.38 % -0.004 -0.010 0.40 % 0.006
(0.24) (1.25) (0.63) (1.01) (1.12) (0.73)
Year -2 0.010 -0.49 % -0.004 0.001 -0.14 % 0.001
(1.27) (1.61) (0.65) (0.08) (0.39) (0.13)
Year -1 0.007 -0.32 % -0.000 0.007 -0.48 % 0.003
(0.83) (1.05) (0.01) (0.69) (1.33) (0.44)
Reference date 0.001 -0.40 % -0.007 0.002 -0.11 % -0.003
(0.08) (0.66) (0.58) (0.11) (0.16) (0.23)
Year 1 -0.053 7.12 % 0.018 0.043 -0.82 % 0.050
(6.61)** (23.33)** (2.69)** (4.19)** (2.29)* (5.32)**
Year 2 -0.034 5.21 % -0.001 0.039 2.20 % 0.042
(4.25)** (17.05)** (0.13) (3.84)** (6.14)** (4.72)**
Year 3 -0.036 3.83 % -0.004 0.034 1.89 % 0.032
(4.43)** (12.55)** (0.69) (3.39)** (5.27)** (3.63)**
Year 4 -0.030 2.88 % -0.003 0.027 0.60 % 0.018
(3.71)** (9.42)** (0.41) (2.67)** (1.69) (2.05)*
Year 5 -0.024 2.24 % -0.007 0.016 -0.11 % 0.020
(3.02)** (7.34)** (1.11) (1.60) (0.31) (2.23)*
Year 6 -0.027 1.53 % -0.007 0.016 -0.41 % 0.013
(3.30)** (5.00)** (1.01) (1.54) (1.14) (1.41)
Observations 4113911 4120802 3704037 1094892 1096914 956995
R2 0.23 0.02 0.31 0.19 0.03 0.28
Notes: **, * denotes significance at the 1% , 5% level respectively. T-values in parentheses. UP is the
unemployment probability times 100.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
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between the boom values and the recession values in the subfigures of figure 2.3 and 2.4
corresponds to a DiD estimate in table 2.3 and 2.4.
2.5.1 Main Results
The upper panel of figure 2.3 shows the estimated earnings losses of displaced workers.
During the first year after plant closure, displaced workers suffer a strong decline in
earnings in the range of 23% to 34%, depending on the size of the former employer and
the business cycle. For all groups of workers the earnings losses get smaller over time
but are still substantially higher than 10% even six years after displacement. The most
striking difference between workers displaced from small firms (subfigure b) and workers
displaced from large firms (subfigure a) is that for the former the earnings losses are higher
during a boom than during a recession, whereas for workers displaced from large firms
the results are the opposite.
As column one of table 2.3 shows, workers displaced from large firms face an earnings
loss during the first post-displacement year which is 5.3 percentages points (p.p.) higher
if the displacement occurs during a recession rather than during a boom. Six years after
displacement the DiD still amounts to -2.7 p.p.; in other words, workers displaced from
large firms in a recession suffer higher earnings losses than those displaced from large firms
in a boom even in the long run. Workers displaced from small firms suffer earnings losses
which are 4.3 p.p larger when the plant closure occurs during a boom rather than during
a recession (column four of table 2.3). These DiD estimates decrease over time to 2.7 p.p
four years after the displacement. Five years after the displacement the difference between
boom and recession becomes insignificant. This provides first evidence supporting the
hypothesis that workers displaced from small firms during a boom are treated differently
by the labor market and suffer the highest earnings losses. One explanation for this
finding could be that workers displaced from small firms and seeking new jobs during a
boom carry a negative signal with them due to their displacement.
Interestingly, the results for Austria for the post-displacement years are in line with the
findings of Jacobson et al. (1993) who did similar research with data from Pennsylvanian.
For all workers the DiD estimates in earnings are insignificant for the six pre-displacement
years.14 This implies that workers have no ex-ante differences in earnings after controlling
for individual-specific and firm-specific characteristics, ruling out a selection explanation.
To identify the source of variation in the earnings losses, I split them up into the
UP effect and the wage effect, accounting for the fact that a decline in earnings for one
specific group of workers can arise either from a higher fraction of unemployed workers
with zero work income or just from lower wages. Subfigure c and d of figure 2.3 show that
14The only exception is the significant DiD of -2.7% four years before the displacement for workers
displaced from small firms.
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one year after displacement PC workers are faced with a 15% to 22% lower probability
to be employed than NPC workers, depending on the size of the former employer and
the business cycle. This is not surprising because, per definition, all PC workers lose
their jobs. The difference in the UP between PC and NPC workers is more than halved
during the second year and then decreases slowly thereafter to about 2.5 % six years
after displacement. Hence, a big part of the large earnings losses during the first post-
displacement year can be explained by the large fraction of PC workers that do not find
a new job immediately.
Column two of table 2.3 shows that workers displaced from large firms have a 7 p.p.
lower probability to find a new job during the first post-displacement year if the plant
closure occurs during a recession rather than during a boom. This positive DiD in the
UP decreases over time to 1.5 p.p. six years after the displacement. In addition to the
lower probability of finding a new job during the first year, workers displaced from large
firms during a recession earn 1.8 p.p lower wages than those displaced in a boom (column
three of table 2.3). The positive DiD in wages becomes insignificant after the second year.
Thus the higher earnings losses for workers displaced from large firms in a recession as
opposed to boom are largely driven by the higher fraction of unemployed workers with
zero earnings.
For workers displaced from small firms, things are different, as shown in columns five
and six of table 2.3. In the first post-displacement year workers displaced in a recession
have better chances of finding a new job than workers displaced in a boom and thus
the according DiD is negative (column five). From the second to the fourth year after
displacement workers displaced in a boom have better chances of finding a new job than
those displaced during a recession. During the following two years the DiD estimates in
the UP becomes insignificant. Therefore, the larger earnings loss during the first post-
displacement year for workers displaced in a boom rather than during a recession is due
to a combined effect of the higher probability of being unemployed and lower wages. In
following three years the significantly higher earnings losses are mainly driven by the large
wage decline, because the positive DiD in the UP imposes ceteris paribus larger earnings
losses during a recession.
The separation of the earnings losses into a wage effect and an UP effect shows that, the
fact that workers displaced from small firms suffer higher earnings losses during a boom
instead of during a recession is largely due to the large reduction in wage. The same
method shows that the main driving factor of the opposite phenomenon, that workers
displaced from large firms suffer higher earnings losses during a recession as opposed to
during a boom, is the larger fraction of unemployed workers with zero earnings.
Next, I will present the results from the separation of the wage effect into the selection
and the net wage effect. The selection effect picks up differences in the composition of
employed workers and sheds light on two different aspects. First, comparing the selection
23
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f. Net wage effect
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Table 2.4: Difference in differences: wages, selection effect, net wage effect
Sample Large firms Small firms
Dep. Variable Wages SEa NWEb Wages SEa NWEb
Year -6 0.005 -0.004 0.009 -0.013 0.007 -0.019
(0.78) (0.64) (2.63)** (1.51) (0.85) (4.32)**
Year -5 0.006 -0.001 0.006 -0.005 0.004 -0.010
(0.90) (0.16) (2.01)* (0.63) (0.55) (2.15)*
Year -4 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.000
(0.33) (0.76) (0.73) (0.38) (0.36) (0.07)
Year -3 -0.004 -0.006 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.003
(0.63) (1.06) (0.69) (0.73) (0.34) (0.75)
Year -2 -0.004 -0.007 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.65) (1.22) (0.93) (0.13) (0.12) (0.46)
Year -1 -0.000 -0.005 0.005 0.003 0.000 0.003
(0.01) (0.97) (1.71) (0.44) (0.07) (0.71)
Reference date -0.007 -0.006 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 -0.003
(0.58) (0.53) (0.16) (0.23) (0.02) (0.39)
Year 1 0.018 0.001 0.017 0.050 0.013 0.037
(2.69)** (0.22) (4.73)** (5.32)** (1.49) (7.29)**
Year 2 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.042 0.018 0.023
(0.13) (0.22) (0.65) (4.72)** (2.22)* (4.90)**
Year 3 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.032 0.021 0.011
(0.69) (0.15) (1.06) (3.63)** (2.51)* (2.36)*
Year 4 -0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.018 0.025 -0.007
(0.41) (0.27) (1.25) (2.05)* (2.99)** (1.43)
Year 5 -0.007 0.003 -0.010 0.020 0.024 -0.004
(1.11) (0.44) (2.87)** (2.23)* (2.81)** (0.80)
Year 6 -0.007 -0.001 -0.004 0.013 0.022 -0.010
(1.01) (0.16) (1.15) (1.41) (2.58)** (1.91)
Observations 3704037 3704037 3704037 956995 956995 956995
R2 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.23
Notes: **, * denotes significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively. T-values in parentheses. UP
is the unemployment probability * 100. (a) SE reports the selection effect given by wage. (b)
NWE reports the net wage effect given by (wagei − wagei)
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
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effect before and after the plant closure for one specific group of workers helps to under-
stand if the composition of employed workers within this group is affected by the plant
closure. Second, the estimated DiD between the selection effect during a boom versus
during a recession helps to better understand the DiD estimates found for the wage effect.
A positive DiD of the selection effect indicates that the fraction of re-employed high wage
workers is larger during a recession than during a boom. The net wage effect at time t
captures the individual difference in wage t years after the plant closure and the average
wage in the two pre-displacement years.
Results for the first differences are presented in figure 2.4. The subfigures a and b of
figure 2.4 show again the wage effect (the vertical axis is rescaled for better illustration),
and the subfigures c and d show the regression results of wagei, which corresponds to the
selection effect. Finally, the subfigures e and f show the regression results of (wageit −
wagei). This can be interpreted as the net wage effect. The estimated DiD and the
corresponding t-values are given in table 2.4.
First, I will discuss the results solely for workers displaced from large firms, subse-
quently I will discuss the results for workers displaced only from small firms. Results for
workers displaced from large firms are presented in the subfigures in the left column of fig-
ure 2.4 and column one to three in table 2.4. The results indicate that workers displaced
from large firms suffer a 1.8 p.p larger wage decline during the first post-displacement
year if the plant closure occurs during a boom rather than during a recession (column
1 of table 2.3. In the second year workers displaced during a recession suffer a stronger
wage decline than workers displaced during a boom, which leads to an insignificant DiD
estimate for wages in the second year. In the last four years there are no significant differ-
ences in the wage effect between workers displaced during a boom versus those displaced
during a recession. Subfigure c shows that over the whole observation period there are no
statistically significant differences in the selection effect between the boom and the reces-
sion. This implies that the composition of PC workers who find a new job is independent
of the business cycle for workers displaced from large firms. Therefore, the larger wage
decline during the first post-displacement year for workers displaced during a boom is
induced by a larger net wage decline (subfigure e). In the last four observed years there
are hardly any differences between boom and recession in the wage effect, the selection
effect and the net wage effect. Therefore, the according DiD estimates are statistically
equal to zero. The wage losses for workers displaced from large firms are only affected by
the business cycle in the short run.
In the pre-displacement years the wage differences between PC and NPC workers
decline slightly over time. One possible explanation for this finding is that large firms try
to avoid an imminent bankruptcy by reducing the wages of their employees. Comparing
the composition of workers (subfigure c) of the last pre-displacement year with the first
post-displacement year shows that, on average, a worker who finds a new job directly after
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displacement has had higher wages in the two pre-displacement years than the average
worker in the year directly before the plant closure. In other words, high wage workers
displaced from large firms have somewhat better chances to find a new job in the first
post-displacement year than low wage workers displaced from large firms, independent of
the business cycle.
Now the results for workers displaced from small firms will be discussed, shown in
the subfigures in the right column of figure 2.4 and the last three columns in table 2.4.
Workers displaced during a boom suffer a 5 p.p. larger wage decline during the first
year than workers displaced during a recession (column 4 in table 2.4). Thereafter, the
DiD estimates declines more or less continuously over time to 2 p.p five years after the
displacement. In contrast to the findings for workers displaced from large firms, workers
displaced from small firms suffer larger wage decline even in the long run if the plant
closure occurs during a boom instead of during a recession.
The findings for the selection effect (subfigure d) show that if the plant closure occurs
during a recession high wage workers find a new job first, whereas during a boom an
average wage worker finds a new job first. This yields a positive estimated DID of about
2 p.p. for the selection effect from two to six years after the displacement, in contrast to the
findings for workers displaced from large firms. Subfigure f shows that workers displaced
from small firms during a boom suffer a net wage decline of almost 5 p.p. during the first
year, but no additional net wage decline during the next five years. Workers displaced
during a recession suffer a yearly wage decline of around 1.2 p.p. during the first four
years. The milder net wage decline of workers displaced during a recession rather than
during a boom leads to significant positive DiD estimates in the net wage effect during
the first three years after displacement. The DiD estimates become insignificant during
the last three years.
During the first three post-displacement years, there are two reasons why workers
displaced from small firms during a boom suffer a higher wage loss than those displaced
during a recession. First, high wage workers have a harder time finding a new job if
the plant closure occurs during a boom rather than during a recession. Second, workers
displaced during a boom suffer a higher net wage decline during the first three years after
the plant closure. From the fourth to the sixth post-displacement year the positive DiD
estimates in wages are only due to the fraction of high wage workers who find a new job
first, which is higher during a recession than during a boom.
Again, results indicate that the labor market treats workers displaced from small firms
differently, depending on whether they are displaced during a boom or during a recession.
In the short run all workers displaced during a boom are punished by higher net wage
declines than workers who are displaced during a recession. It seems to be the case
thought that only high wage workers are punished in the long run. Even six years after
displacement, high wage workers displaced during a boom have more problems finding a
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new job than high wage workers displaced during a recession. This result may indicate
that high wage workers are held most responsible for the bad performance of a firm which
in turn leads to the plant closure. Low wage workers are also punished by larger net wage
declines if they are displaced during a boom rather than during a recession.
Krashinsky (2002) showed that the difference between the earnings losses of laid off
workers compared with the earnings losses of displaced workers found by Gibbons and
Katz (1991) becomes insignificant after one controls for the size of the former and the
new employer. To take this into account, I have run two regressions with the wage as
dependent variable (specification 2.2) where the size of the new employer is included as an
additional regressor. The results are shown in table A.1. The DiD estimates in wages for
workers displaced from large firms are now insignificant over the whole post-displacement
period. The only difference to the results where the size of the new employer is ignored,
is that the DiD coefficient for the first year after displacement is insignificant too. This is
even stronger evidence for the hypothesis that workers displaced from large firms do not
carry a negative signal at all, as suggested by Gibbons and Katz (1991). Conversely, the
DiD estimates for workers displaced from small firms are even larger when one includes
the size of the new employer. In other words, the results found in this chapter are not
affected by the size of the new employer.
2.6 Conclusions
Most previous empirical studies on plant closure focused on earnings losses at one specific
point in the business cycle. Nakamura (2004) showed for the first time within the frame-
work of a theoretical model that earnings losses are larger when the plant closure occurs
in a boom period instead of in a recession period. To my knowledge there is no paper
analyzing if there are different effects between workers getting displaced from small firms
compared to large firms. The displacement is a stronger signal about individuals’ produc-
tivity for workers getting displaced from small firms than from a large firm. Furthermore,
there are different signals of getting displaced at the beginning of a boom period than at
the beginning of a recession period.
In this chapter, I show that in Austria workers displaced from small firms suffer
significantly higher declines in earnings when they lose their job at the beginning of
a longer boom period than at the beginning of a longer recession period. The larger
earnings losses in boom are hardly driven by the according larger declines in wages. This
finding goes hand in hand with the findings from Nakamura (2004) for the United States.
For workers getting displaced from large firms the results are opposite. These displaced
workers suffer larger earnings losses when they get displaced at the beginning of a recession
period. The difference between the boom and the recession is strongly driven by large
differences in the UP, in contrast to the findings for small firms where the UP effect does
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not depend on the business cycle.
Separating the wage effect in a selection effect and a net wage effect gives evidence
that workers displaced from small firms in boom get punished. Moreover it seems that
high wage workers get punished heavier than low wage workers. For displaced workers
from large firms and from small firms in recession there seems to be no such punishment.
This is evidence that these workers do not carry a bad signal from the displacement, as
proposed by Gibbons and Katz (1991).
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2.A Appendix
Table A.1: DiD Wages, including the size of the new employer
Sample Large firms Small firms
Dep. Variable Wages Wages
Year -6 -0.003 -0.003
(0.45) (0.31)
Year -5 -0.002 0.004
(0.28) (0.46)
Year -4 -0.006 0.003
(0.86) (0.36)
Year -3 -0.007 0.016
(1.10) (1.85)
Year -2 -0.006 0.010
(0.85) (1.26)
Year -1 -0.003 0.013
(0.40) (1.61)
Reference Date -0.009 0.005
(0.72) (0.32)
Year 1 0.007 0.058
(0.96) (5.65)**
Year 2 -0.004 0.052
(0.56) (5.40)**
Year 3 -0.008 0.041
(1.10) (4.27)**
Year 4 -0.006 0.030
(0.77) (3.08)**
Year 5 -0.008 0.034
(1.06) (3.43)**




Notes: **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% level respectively. T-values
in parentheses. UP is the unemployment probability times 100.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
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CHAPTER 3
Wages and Risks at the Workplace:
Evidence from Linked Firm-Worker Data
joint with Rafael Lalive and Josef Zweimüller
”Virtually no matched worker-firm records are available for empirical research,
but obviously are crucial for the precise measurement of job and personal
attributes required for empirical calculations. Not only will the availability
of such data produce sharper estimates of the wage-job attributes equalizing
differences function, but also will allow more detailed investigations of the
sorting and assignment aspects of the theory.”
Rosen (1986), p.688.
3.1 Introduction
One of the oldest views on wage determination holds that observed differences in wages
reflect compensation for non-wage aspects of jobs. One aspect that has received a con-
siderable amount of attention in the previous literature is the compensation of the risk of
workplace injuries. This chapter reconsiders the importance of such compensating wage
differentials using linked firm-worker data reporting both workers’ injuries and workers’
earnings. Twenty years ago almost no linked firm-worker data were available. In recent
years new data sets of that kind have been increasingly used to study labor market phe-
nomena (for a survey, see Abowd and Kramarz, 1999). While these data have been mainly
used to study the (firm- and worker-specific) determinants of wages, previous research has
not yet looked at (firm- and worker-) determinants of non-wage aspects of jobs and the
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repercussions on wages. In this chapter we shed new light on the empirical evidence
concerning the joint (firm- and worker-) determinants of wages and workplace risks.
We argue that linked firm-worker data allow us to identify the building blocks of the
theory – the wages and workplace risks attached to a firm. The risk of injury results from
the interplay between the risk inherent in the workplace and the risk and the mobility
behavior of the worker. The theory of compensating wage differentials holds that workers
exposed to higher injury risks should be compensated by higher wages. In contrast, there is
no reason to compensate a worker for risk that is attached to his or her behavior (reflecting
lack of precaution, dexterity, or diligence) unless this increases his or her productivity.
Our empirical analysis relies on a unique administrative data set from Austria. This
data set covers the universe of Austrian male blue collar workers and their firms (about
620,000 individuals employed in more than 60,000 firms). A unique feature of our data
is that we can observe, for each individual, the number, the exact timing (on a daily
basis) and the severeness (as measured by lost work days) of workplace accidents over
the period January 2000 to December 2002. Since our data set covers the universe of
Austrian employees and since we know the workers’ complete earnings and employment
history across different firms, we have also exhaustive information on injuries at the firm-
level. Exploiting this information allows us to disentangle risks and wages attached to
the firm from risks and wages specific to the worker.
Our empirical strategy is as follows. Using econometric techniques developed by
Abowd et al. (2002) we split up observed wages into a (time-constant) worker-effect and
firm-effect. We then proceed in an analogous way for observed injuries to disentangle the
risk inherent to the workplace from the risk attached to the behavior of the worker. While
injury incidences are not very informative at the individual level – workplace injuries are
rare events and mainly reflect good or bad luck – we argue that these measures are infor-
mative at a higher level of aggregation. A similar problem arises for small firms. Hence,
while the frequency of injuries may largely reflect the true injury risk of a workplace, the
small frequency of injuries in smaller firms also call for aggregation to a higher level. With
aggregation, the random component is averaged out and variation in injuries across labor
market cells yield information on variation in the risk exposure of workers.
Our empirical strategy adds two new elements to existing studies. First, by identifying
the relationship between wages and injury risks that are specific to the firm it identifies
the building blocks of the theory and provides refined empirical estimates for the hedonic
wage function. Second, by wages and risks that are attached to the worker, we can also
address the issue of how workers sort themselves across different workplaces. In particular,
we can study whether workers with a high earnings capacity choose more secure jobs and
whether workers willing to take high risks (or high ability to avoid risks) sort themselves
into high-paying jobs.
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Our empirical analysis yields the following results. First, our results indicate that,
consistent with the theory of compensating wage differentials, firm wages and firm risks
are positively correlated. This result is robust and holds for different subsamples and
alternative measures of workplace risks (incidence versus duration; and aggregation level
of the risks measure). Quantitatively, our preferred estimates imply a value of a statistical
(non-fatal) injury equal to $20,000, which is on the lower end of the $20,000 to $70,000
found for other industrialized countries (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). Second, our empirical
strategy also allows us to shed new light on the sorting of workers across firms that offer
different workplace (dis)amenities. We find no evidence in favor of a sorting of high-
productivity workers into low-risk jobs. This suggests that the bias of the compensating
differential obtained from a standard cross-sectional hedonic wage function that is due
to unobserved productivity of workers is small. However, we find that, conditional on
firm-risk, high-risk workers sort themselves into high-wage jobs. This is consistent with
an explanation that workers who are willing to take high risks also accept other workplace
disamenities (and be compensated for them).
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly discusses related literature.
Section 3.3 presents a simple model of wage determination where workers differ both in
productivity and in the ability to avoid workplace accidents; and firms differ in the wages
and the riskiness of workplaces they offer. Section 3.4 presents the data and gives first
descriptive evidence on the relationship between the injury risk and earnings. Section 3.5
gives some institutional background on wage determination and insurance against work-
place accidents in Austria. Section 3.6 briefly discusses the econometric methodology to
disentangle worker- and firm-effects for both wages and injury risks. Section 3.7 presents
the main results and checks their robustness. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Among the early papers studying the impact of job-injury risk on earnings on the U.S.
labor market are Thaler and Rosen (1975), Brown (1980), Leigh (1981), and Arnould
and Nichols (1983) who use risk data collected by Society of Actuaries for 1967 whereas
Hamermesh (1978), Viscusi (1980), and Fairris (1989) find that self-reported riskiness
of one’s job is significantly positive related to an individual’s wage. Duncan and Holm-
lund (1983), using Swedish data, show that longitudinal data are necessary to reveal any
significant compensating differential of various job disamenities.
A major issue in the empirical literature of estimating compensating wage differentials
is the issue of sorting. Many authors have argued (e.g. Brown, 1980; Hwang et al., 1992)
that worker’s productivity characteristics (such as talent and innate ability) that are un-
observable to the researcher may bias the estimated compensating differential downward.
When workplace safety is a normal good, workers with high earnings potential will select
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themselves into less risky jobs. Using simulation techniques Hwang et al. (1992) show
that, when such differences in unobservable productivity are not accounted for, the es-
timated compensating differential may be strongly downward biased and even lead to
”wrongly-signed” coefficients. However, Shogren and Stamland (2002) show that when
workers differ in the ability to avoid risk, the standard hedonic wage regression may
bias the compensating wage differential upwards. They show that also this bias could
be very large. Garen (1988) emphasizes that individuals may systematically differ in
productivity-relevant characteristics that are specific to dangerous jobs. ”Coolheaded-
ness” makes workers more productive on a dangerous job but ”coolheadedness” may not
be relevant in a safe job. Garen (1988) and DeLeire and Levy (2004) use family character-
istics as instruments elaborating the idea that being responsible for others lets individuals
choose less dangerous jobs. These papers find evidence for systematic sorting of workers
into jobs.1
Linked firm-worker data have not been used to study the importance of compensating
wage differential for workplace injury risks. The only exception known to us is Dale-
Olsen (2006) using linked firm-worker data from Norway. The focus in his paper is on
dynamic aspects of worker- and firm-behavior such as quits and job durations whereas
our paper focuses on the issue of disentangling worker- and firm-effects in the hedonic
wage equation.
3.3 A Simple Model
Consider a simple model of wage determination and non-fatal injury risk, inspired by
Viscusi and Aldy (2003). Denote by w a worker’s wage and, respectively, the utility with
and without an injury by U(w) and V (w) with standard assumptions U ′(w) > 0 > U ′′(w)
and V ′(w) > 0 > V ′′(w). The probability that an injury occurs is given by p. Assume for
simplicity that the utility in the case of an injury V (w) = (1 − k)U(w) where k should
be thought of as a measure of the severeness of an injury. This lets us write the worker’s
expected utility as EU = [1 − pk]U(w).
Now assume that the hedonic wage function is linear and given by w = h + βp
where h denotes a worker’s earnings capacity and β is the compensating wage differential.
Substituting the budget constraint into the expected utility expression, the optimal level
of risk chosen by the worker is implicitly given by the first order condition
1A further related strand of the literature explores to which extent observed industry wage premiums
are associated with wages compensating for on-the-job risk. Leigh (1995) and Dorman and Hagstrom
(1988) compare models with and without dummy variables for industry affiliation and conclude that
industry-wage differentials reflect to a large extent risk-premiums. The recent literature addresses the
problems with measuring compensation for risk. Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) and Ashenfelter
(2006) use mandated speed limits to measure the value of a statistical life. Heliwell and Huang (2005)
use information on life satisfaction, wages, and workplace characteristics to identify compensating wage
differentials.
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∂EU
∂p
= −kU(w) + [1 − pk]βU ′(w) = 0.
Using this condition, we can now easily study how the optimal level of risk-taking







kU ′(w) − [1 − pk]βU ′′(w)
2kU ′(w) − [1 − pk]βU ′′(w)
< 0.
A workers higher earnings capacity unambiguously reduces the degree of risk that
workers are willing to take. A corollary of this result is that, when variation in wages is to
a large extent due to unobserved productivity of workers, estimating compensating wage
differentials from cross-sectional data suffer from ability bias and will underestimate the
true compensating differential.
A further potentially important dimension of sorting concerns the ability of individuals
to cope with risky workplaces. The reason why an industry can have a high number of
injuries is twofold. On the one hand there are differences in injury rates because there
are differences in risks embodied in the workplace. This is emphasized by the standard
theory of compensating differentials. On the other hand, there are differences in industry
injury rates because different industries select different workers. When workers differ in
their ability to cope with workplace risks – because of differences in worker’s dexterity,
precaution, and diligence – there may be further sorting of workers across high- and low-
risk industries. It is straightforward to explore this argument in the context of the above
model. Assume workers differ in the ability to avoid an injury and that the probability
that a worker of type π experiences an injury is given by
p(π) = pπ
where π > 0 says that a worker of type π is π times as likely to experience an injury
than the average worker. Of course, it must be that πmax < 1/p.
The worker now maximizes EU = [1 − pπk]U(w) taking the hedonic wage equation
w = h+ βp as given.2 The first order condition is now
∂EU
∂p
= −kπU(w) + [1 − pπk]βU ′(w) = 0.
2One could further assume that it matters for the productivity of a worker how able he or she is in coping
with workplace risks. Realistically, the occurrence of an injury will be associated with lower output, so
the expected productivity of a high-risk worker will be lower. On a perfect labor market (where a worker’s
risk is common knowledge) this should result in a lower output. Hence, ceteris paribus, a worker with low
ability to cope with workplace risks should also get lower wages. To include this argument into the above
framework we could assume, for instance, a hedonic wage equation of the form. w = h + βp − γπ. Using
such a specification of the hedonic wage equation would lead to the same sorting patterns as discussed in
the main text.
35
3.4. Data Wages and Risks at the Workplace




kU(w) + pkβU ′(w)
2kβπU ′(w) − [1 − pπk]β2U ′′(w)
< 0,
which implies that high-risk workers will sort themselves into low-risk workplaces.
3.4 Data
We assess the extent to which wages compensate for injury risks with linked employer-
employee data from Austria. We use data from two different sources: (i) the Austrian
social security data (ASSD3) and (ii) the Austrian statutory accident insurance (Allge-
meine Unfallversicherungsanstalt, AUVA). These data sets were merged for the purpose
of this study on an individual (and anonymized) basis. The available data include the
universe of Austrian private sector workers who were employed at some date between
January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2002. The ASSD reports the workers’ complete em-
ployment and work history since January 1, 1972 and the AUVA-data report the complete
history of occupational injuries (incidence and duration) between the period January 1,
2000 and December 31, 2002. Both data sets are linked via an individual identifier (the
workers’ anonymous social security number). The ASSD also contains a firm identifier
from we can infer, on a daily basis, at which firms a worker is employed. Because our
data set includes the universe of all private sector workers, we have exhaustive informa-
tion not only on the workers’ but also on the firms’ history of occupational injuries (and
the corresponding earnings) over the period January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2002.
Both the ASSD and the AUVA-data are administrative data set that is unlikely to
suffer from measurement error. The ASSD contains all data necessary to calculate old
age social security benefits. (Benefits levels depend both on previous earnings and on the
number of months during which social security contributions were paid.) Since contribut-
ing to the old age insurance fund is mandatory and since non-compliance with reporting
rules are subject to sanctions (fines), this data set contains high-quality information on
workers employment and earnings history.
Our empirical analysis is confined to workers in the age group 25-65. As the data
report daily earnings but do not provide information on average working hours per day,
we focus on male workers (where variation in wages results predominantly from variation
in hourly wages rather than variation in daily hours worked) and exclude female workers
(many of whom work part-time). Moreover, we focus on blue collar workers because the
social security contribution ceiling is not binding for this group – implying that top-coding
of earnings is not a problem – so that we can use standard methods to decompose wages.
Furthermore, occupational injuries are much more prevalent in blue collar jobs, we exclude
3For a detailed description of the ASSD see Kuhn and Ruf (2006)
36
3.5. Institutional Background Wages and Risks at the Workplace
white collars. We also excluded multiple job-holders, workers with wages below the social
security threshold (Mindestgrenze) and above the social security earnings cap (Höchstbe-
messungsgrundlage).4 Furthermore, as identification of firm- and worker-components in
earnings and risks can only be accomplished for workers moving between firms, we could
only concentrate on those subset of workers and firms for which identification of both
worker and firm effects was possible.5 We ended up with 618,125 male blue collar workers
working in 62,497 firms. We split the three-years period 2000 - 2002 into six semesters
(using wage observations at May 10 and November 10 of each year) and calculating flow
variables (such as the number of injuries, days of work experience, etc.) on a semesterly
basis. In total this leads to 2,845,770 observations.
Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics for this sample. The yearly risk of an injury
per 100 full-time workers is 7.2 percent. Notice that this is a rather high number when
compared to statistics from other data sources. The reason is twofold. First, we focus
on male blue collar workers, a group that is typically employed in more risky workplaces.
Second, we define the risk of an injury as the number of workplace injuries within one
year, divided by the number of calendar days during which workers were in employment.
This implies that spells of unemployment (or non-employment) are not counted in the
denominator of the risk-variable. The number of lost working days per 100 workers is
about 97 days. Again, this number is somewhat higher than those found in other data
sets because we focus on male blue collars. The average daily wage in the sample is
about 70 Euros (or $100). On average, workers in our data set have 16.8 years of work
experience since January 1972, were employed for 7.4 years by their current firm and are
39 years old. The size of the firm in which the typical worker is employed is 467.
3.5 Institutional Background
Our simple model above and our empirical analysis below implicitly assumes that wages
and working conditions are the outcome of individual choices by workers and firms which
interact on a perfect labor market. This is clearly a simplification in the Austrian context
where wage determination is the outcome of negotiations between national unions and
employer federations. Bargaining takes place at the industry level but there is coordi-
nation both among employer federations and among the various industrial unions. Each
fall, yearly negotiations about wage raises take place between unions and employers in
the metal industry. The outcome of which usually serves as a benchmark for the negotia-
4For earnings below the Mindestgrenze and the part of the earnings above the Höchstbemessungs-
grundlage, workers do not have to pay social security contributions. For the former group records are
incomplete. For the latter group we do not know the exact amount of earnings (we only know that earnings
are above the cap). Applying both criteria lead to exclusion of 4014 workers.
5This requires that firms and workers are ”connected” (see Abowd and Kramarz (1999)). Two subsets
of the labor market are connected, if at least one worker moves from one subset to the other.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. dev.
Injury risk 7.238 (44.703)
Duration 97.002 (983.642)
Wage rate 69.906 (20.112)







Notes: Mean refers to the average over all 2,845,770 semester-observations.
Injury risk measures the yearly number of injuries per 100 continuously em-
ployed workers. Injury duration measures the yearly number of lost workdays
for 100 workers. Experience (tenure) measures the number of years spent in
employment (with the current employer) since January 1972 (the starting
point of our data).
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD and AUVA.
tions in other industries. As in many European countries, bargaining coverage in Austria
exceeds union density. Negotiated wage increases are extended to all employees within
the industry.6
Despite this seemingly strong influence of national trade unions on wage determi-
nation, wage dispersion in Austria is substantial. First, bargaining sets a wage floor
(”Kollektivvertragslöhne”) whereas actually paid wages typically deviate from this floor
and only a small fraction of employees are paid the minimum wage. Second, the bar-
gaining system is two-tiered: wages negotiated at the industry level may be readjusted
by subsequent negotiations at the firm-level leaving room for firm-specific circumstances
which will partly include job amenities. Finally, while negotiations also include wage
raises for job stayers paid above the minimum wage (”Istlöhne”), much wage dispersion
arises from individual raises (above the negotiated raises) and/or from job movers.7 As
6Austria is often considered as having one of the most centralized systems of wage determination
(Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and OECD (2004)), a view that is not shared by insiders (see e.g. Pollan
(2000)).
7The centrally negotiated industry wage sets a lower limit, the actual wage outcome may well be higher
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a result, bargaining outcomes are rarely a binding constraint for wages individually ne-
gotiated between the firm and the worker. In sum, while the bargaining system looks
prima facie strongly regulated, there is substantial wage dispersion potentially reflecting
compensation for differences in workplace amenities.8
There is mandatory insurance against workplace accidents and occupational diseases
by which all dependent employees (and, in case of a fatal injury, their family dependants)
are covered. Workers are eligible to disability benefits when a workplace accidents leads to
inability of work for more than 3 months. The level of these benefits depends on the extent
of the disability (as measured by the degree of incapacity of work) between 13 percent
of the previous wage (for 20 percent work incapacity) and 100 percent of the previous
wage (for 100 percent incapacity). Moreover, the worker is eligible to full coverage of all
expenses related to medical treatment and/or rehabilitation of workplace accidents.9
3.6 Methodology and Empirical Strategy
This section discusses the decomposition of the log of earnings per day into a worker
effect, a firm effect, and an error term. Moreover, the section discusses how to separate
the risk of injury into worker and firm effects.
Decomposing Wages Let wit be the log earnings per day of worker i at time t, let xit
denote the time-varying characteristics, and let J(i, t) be the identification number of the
firm at which worker i is employed at time t. We assume that
wit = xitβ






E[ǫwit|i, t, J(i, t), xit] = 0. (3.2)
The wage policy of the firm is modeled as simple as possible.10 The firm effect in the wage
as bargaining rules leave scope for subsequent firm-level negotiations. According to personal information
from the union officials of the ”Gewerkschaft Metall Textil Nahrung” of the Austrian Labor Union (OeGB),
only 4.7 percent of all workers in the metal industry are paid the ’minimum wage’ and subsequent firm-level
negotiations lead to agreements which have been up to 1.5 percent above the industry wage settlement
depending on firm performance.
8See Duncan and Stafford (1980) for a theoretical analysis of compensating differentials when wages
are determined under collective bargaining.
9The fact that workers are compensated in terms of disability benefits implies that the compensated
wage differential estimated on wage data only underestimates the true market value of risk. See Arnould
and Nichols (1983) for an analysis of how including workers’ insurance against workplace accidents affects
the compensating wage differential.
10A more elaborate model for the wage policy allows for firm-specific returns to tenure. However,
keeping the wage policy of the firm as simple as in equation 3.1 allows identifying the wage policy for a
larger number of firms because only one parameter per firm needs to be estimated. Moreover, allowing for
firm-specific returns to seniority does not affect results of the wage decomposition (Gruetter and Lalive,
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rate, ψwj , captures the wage differential earned in the present firm compared to the average
firm in the data set. The worker’s wage component, θwi , reflects differences in pay due to
time-invariant characteristics of each worker such as ability but also education.11 Thus,
the worker effect in the wage rate measures the extent to which compensation for skill is
important. Finally, the parameter βw measures economy-wide returns to experience or
productivity increases (see the following section for a definition of the vector x).
Intuitively, the worker’s effect on the wage and the firm’s effect on the wage can be
separated by observing workers moving between firms. The wage change associated with
a job change provides information on the firm effect of the new firm relative to the firm
effect in the old firm. The main statistical assumption is the assumption of exogenous
mobility between employers (equation 3.2). This assumption basically ensures that the
model is identified. The exogenous mobility assumption rules out correlation between
unmeasured time-varying effects on the wage rate captured by ǫwit with the person effect
θwi , the firm effect ψ
w
J(i,t) or the time varying observed effects xit. Note, however, that
this assumption does not rule out that workers move to better paying firms. Correlation
between the firm effect and the mobility decision does not imply that the assumption
of exogenous mobility is invalid. Furthermore, in previous work we find that endogenous
mobility does not lead to a strong bias in decomposing wages (Gruetter and Lalive, 2004).
Direct estimation of the model (3.1) by least squares is impossible because this is a
large two-way fixed effect problem. While we can eliminate the worker fixed effect by
taking deviations from worker means, there are still more than 60,000 firm effects that
need to be estimated (Abowd and Kramarz, 1999). This chapter uses a modified version
of the iterative algorithm proposed in (Abowd et al., 2002) to solve for the least squares
parameter estimates β̂, θ̂i, and ψ̂j (see appendix for a description of our algorithm).
Decomposing Injury Risk This chapter argues that workplace injuries are generated
by factors which are firm specific (technology, safety regulations, work stress, ...) and
by factors, which are worker-specific (precaution, ability, skill level, ...). Because workers
need to be compensated only for the risk of injury to which they are exposed on the
job, we are also interested in measuring the firm’s contribution to the risk of an injury
or illness. We therefore propose the following statistical model for the relative risk of an
injury or illness of worker i in the half-year t, Rit
Rit = xitβ






E[ǫRit |i, t, J(i, t), xit] = 0. (3.4)
2004).
11Recall that our data do not have information on education.
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Equation (3.3) implies that the risk of an injury or illness is generated by time-varying
individual characteristics, xit, by the firm-effect in risk ψ
R
j , and by the worker effect in
risk θRi . The exogenous mobility assumption (3.4) is required for identification of this
model. We estimate this model again using the iterative algorithm that finds the least
squares solution. Fitting ordinary least squares is appropriate even though the dependent
variable is censored at zero because we are interested in measuring the expected relative
risk conditional on the characteristics x, the firm identifier, and the worker identifier. (We
do not have a model for underlying propensity to have an injury.) Moreover, note that the
average predicted risk of a worker or a firm turns out to be non-negative because ordinary
least squares fits the average risk of each worker or firm. Thus, there is no problem with
’non-sensical’ risk predictions.
Constructing firm- and worker-risk indicators Note that our estimates of the
underlying worker risk and, for small firms, the underlying firm risk is noisy because our
data only covers a three year period. For instance, a worker who happens to have an
accident in half-year t will have a very high estimated worker effect θ̂Ri even though the
underlying true worker effect might be small. Similarly for small firms. This is a problem,
however, that is common to all objective measures of risk. The literature has commonly
dealt with this problem of noise by aggregating the risk measure either to the level of the
industry or occupation (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003).
Our data set gives us some choice about the level of aggregation to which our risk
indicators are aggregated. In our main results, we proceed as follows. For larger firms
(with 50 or more employment observations) we take the estimated firm effects, ψ̂Rit , as
the relevant risk indicator. For smaller firms (less than 50 employment observations) we
aggregate the estimated effects (ψ̂Rit and θ̂
R
i ) within labor market cells (based on industry,
firm size and region). This lets us end up with high variation in exposure to risk and at
the same time avoids measurement problems due to the randomness of individual injury
events. The average firm risk within a labor market cell captures the average risk to
which workers are exposed, given the characteristics of their workplace. Arguably, this is
the component of overall risk in the industry that needs to be compensated. In contrast,
the worker risk within a labor market cell captures the average willingness to take risks
(or the average ability to avoid risks) of workers in a particular labor market segment.
Importantly, these aggregated firm and worker risk measures are much less polluted by
noise than the individual data. We can therefore reliably assess the compensating wage
differential for risk using the industry risk measure.
Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics for the frequency of injuries on the individual
level, on the firm level, and on the level of aggregation to labor market cells for small
firms. Column 1 shows the distribution of injuries across the 618,125 workers in our
sample. The majority of these workers, 87.5 percent, do not experience an injury during
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the observation period; 10.7 percent experience one injury, and 1.8 percent of the workers
experience two or more injuries during the observation period. Column 2 shows the
distribution of injuries across the 62,479 firms in our sample. 72.6 percent of all firms do
not ”produce” an injury during the observation period, 11.7 percent produce one injury,
4.7 percent produce two injuries and 11 percent of all firms produce three or more injuries.
The large fraction of firms with no injuries is driven by the large number of very small
firms in our sample. To avoid the noisiness of risk measures, our aggregation of firms
with less than 50 observations into an industry-size-region labor market cell reduces the
number of risk units to 11,134 labor market cells. In only 20 percent of these cells there
was no injury during the observation period, 25 percent have one or two injuries, another
26 percent have 3 to 6 injuries, and about 29 percent of all cells have more than 6 injuries.
In what follows we will take the labor market cells of column 3 as the relevant unit within
which the risk exposure is measured. However, we will come back to the aggregation
issue in the sensitivity analysis where we will show how our results change when we use
alternative (finer or coarser) levels at which risk is measured.
Table 3.2: Injury incidence, by workers, firms and labor market segments
Workers Firms Labor market segments
# % # % # %
0 540,600 87.46% 45,334 72.56% 2251 20.22%
1 66,266 10.72% 7292 11.67% 1600 14.37%
2 9,397 1.52% 2940 4.71% 1216 10.92%
3 1,514 0.24% 1548 2.48% 955 8.58%
4 268 0.04% 1082 1.73% 814 7.31%
5-6 72 0.01% 1281 2.05% 1126 10.11%
7-9 8 0.00% 981 1.57% 949 8.52%
10-14 774 1.24% 791 7.10%
15-24 612 0.98% 649 5.83%
25-49 437 0.70% 499 4.48%
50+ 198 0.32% 284 2.55%
Total 618,125 100.00% 62,479 100.00% 11,134 100.00%
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
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3.7 Estimating the Compensating Differential for
Injury Risk
In this section we use the method described above to decompose both observed incidence
of workplace accidents and observed wages into firm- and worker-effects and use these
estimated effects to explore the relationship between workplace risks and wages. Taking
the estimated worker fixed effects and the estimated firm fixed effects at face value we
can shed new light on the empirics of compensating wage differentials. In particular, we
interpret the fixed firm effect in the wage equation – to which we will refer as the ”firm
wage” – as reflecting compensation for workplace (dis)amenities associated with the risk
of a workplace injury; and we interpret the fixed firm effect in the risk equation – the ”firm
risk” – as the risk that is attached to the workplace. Under the assumption that firm
wages are true compensations for workplace disamenities (including injury risks) and firm
risks measure the true exposure to injury risk on the workplace, the correlation between
the two components identifies a compensating wage differential for the risk of workplace
injuries.
Similarly, we interpret the estimated worker fixed effect in the wage equation – the
”worker wage” – as a measure of a worker’s productivity and the estimated worker fixed
effect in the risk equation (at some level of aggregation) – the ”worker risk” – as a measure
of the willingness to take a risky job (or the ability to avoid an injury) of the average
worker. Under the assumption that estimated firm- and worker-effects represent true
productivities of and true risks attached to jobs and individual workers, we are not only
able to estimate the compensating differential, but also to characterize the sorting of
workers across jobs with different workplace risks.
3.7.1 Main Results
The standard hedonic wage regression A meaningful starting point is the standard
hedonic wage regression. Figure 3.1 plots the mean log-wage against the annualized mean
incidence of workplace injuries within each of our 11,134 labor market cells. (Recall that,
for larger firms, a cell is the firm itself and, for smaller firms, a cell is an industry-region
aggregate.) We aggregate the observed wage and the observed injury incidence into labor
market cells and plot the resulting means against each other. The number of data points
in figure 3.1 is equal to the 11,134 data labor market cells in our data. The figure shows a
positive and significant correlation between the two variables, albeit there is considerable
variation both in wages and in injuries between cells.
Table 3.3 presents the results of a standard hedonic wage regression that controls
for individual characteristics (age, tenure, and calendar time). Column 1 is based on
a simple cross-sectional regression, whereas column 2 presents results from a regression
that controls for individual worker fixed effects. As indicated in these regressions, the
43
3.7. Results Wages and Risks at the Workplace
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Average injury risk
beta = .0046 ; t−value = 2.4
Notes: Vertical axis measures log daily wage, horizontal axis measures injury risk. Both
measures are aggregated on (plant size)x(region)x(industry) cells for firms with less than 50
observations within the observation period. For larger firms both measures are aggregated
on the firm level. There are 11,134 different risk relevant categories.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD and AUVA.
workplace injury risk of a worker’s labor market cell has a positive and significant effect
on the wage. Unlike previous studies (e.g. Duncan and Holmlund, 1983)) we find that
the point estimate of fixed effects regression is smaller than the point estimate in the
OLS regression. (If workers with a higher fixed wage effect choose safer workplaces, the
OLS coefficient has an upward bias; in that case the fixed effect estimate should be larger
than the OLS-coefficient.) However, we will see below that this result stems from only
allowing for fixed worker-effects but neglecting fixed firm-effects.12 Quantitatively, the
estimated OLS coefficient of column 1 is equal to 0.0056, which implies that, for avoiding
one additional accident in 100 within a year, a worker is willing to sacrifice roughly 0.56
percent of his yearly earnings. Put differently, to avoid 1 injury per year, 100 workers
would be willing to pay 0.6 times a yearly income. A yearly income of an Austrian blue
collar worker is about 25,000 Euros ($35,000). The implied value of a statistical injury is
then roughly 14,000 Euros ($20,000). These numbers compare to the range of $20,000 to
12Our data set does not contain information on the worker’s formal education. However, the vast
majority of blue collar workers leaves the education system after 9 years of schooling (i.e. after the end
of mandatory schooling) and enters some kind of vocational training (”Lehrausbildung”) thereafter.
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Table 3.3: Effect of injury risk (disaggregated) on wage
Dependent variable ln(wage)
OLS FE












Time dummies YES YES
Observations 2,845,770 2,845,770
R2 0.136 0.057
Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% level respec-
tively. Robust t-values in parentheses. Injury risk is aggregated on (plant
size)x(region)x(industry) cells for firms with less than 50 observations within
the observation period. For larger firms the injury risk is aggregated on the
firm level. There are 11,134 different risk relevant categories.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD and AUVA.
$70,000 reported in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for other industrialized countries.13 Hence
our Austrian estimates are within the range of estimates obtained in previous studies. One
possible reason why our estimate is on the lower end of this range is a rather generous
accident and health insurance system provided by the Austrian welfare state.
Firm-wage, worker-wage, and workplace risks In figure 3.2 we extend the standard
procedure in previous studies by looking separately at the effect of observed injury risks
on the firm-wage and the worker-wage. More precisely we first decompose, for each
observation in our data set, the observed wage into a firm- and a worker-effect using the
techniques described in the last section. We then aggregate these estimated effects into
13Most of the regression reviewed in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) are based on cross-sectional hedonic wage
regressions. Hence the main text compares the value of a statistical injury implied by the OLS-coefficient.
The corresponding value on the basis of risk-coefficient estimated by the fixed-effects model would only
be half as large.
45
3.7. Results Wages and Risks at the Workplace
labor market cells and plot the means of the estimated firm- and worker-wages against the
observed incidence of workplace injuries in the respective cell (just like figure 3.1, figure 3.2
displays 11,134 data points). Panel A of figure 3.2 shows the relationship between the (cell
mean of the) estimated firm wage-effect and the (cell mean of the) observed (annualized)
injury-risk; Panel B of figure 3.2 presents the corresponding relationship between the (cell
mean of the) estimated worker wage-effect and the (cell mean of) the observed injury-
risk. From panel A, we see that there is a positive relationship between the firm-wage
component and the injury risk. This is consistent with the theory of compensating wage
differentials. From panel B we do not see such a relationship between the worker -wage
component and the cell workplace-injury risk.
Table 3.4 shows corresponding regression results when we control for individual char-
acteristics. Just like the regressions in table 3.3, columns 1 – 3 of table 3.4 control for age,
tenure, and calendar-time. For ease of comparison, column 1 repeats the risk-coefficient
of the standard (OLS) hedonic wage function of table 3.3. In columns 2 and 3 we use the
estimated firm- and a worker-effects as explanatory variables.
The firm wage regression in column 2 shows that the firm-wage is significantly affected
by the observed injury-risk of the labor market cell. The risk-coefficient amounts to 0.005
and is almost identical to the OLS-coefficient of column 1. The fact that workplace
risks and firm wages are positively correlated is clearly consistent with the theory of
compensating wage differentials. From a theoretical point of view, any wage differential
that compensates for workplace hazards should affect the firm component (but not the
worker component) of the wage. To attract a worker of a given quality, the firm has to
pay the compensating differential to ensure that the (marginal) worker is at least as well
off at the current workplace as on any relevant alternative job.
Column 3 of table 3.4 regresses the injury risk indicator on the worker-wage. We do
not expect a causal effect of the former on the latter but these two indicators should be
correlated if there is sorting. For instance, one important hypothesis holds that, when
workplace safety is a normal good, workers with higher earnings capacity are willing to
sacrifice income in exchange of less risky jobs. Hence individuals with a high worker-wage
should be found in low-risk jobs. The results in table 3.4 do not indicate support for this
hypothesis. To the contrary, the point estimate of the risk-indicator does not show the
expected negative sign. The point estimate is positive and significant (on the 10% level),
though quantitatively small.
Columns 4-6 report the results from a set of regressions similar to those of columns
1-3. However, we now control also for industry and region. Because our risk indicator
is constructed on the basis of industry/region labor market cells, allowing for variation
in wages along these dimensions (on top of variation in workplace injuries) is potentially
important. Hence these regressions provide a first check for the robustness of our re-
sults. It turns out that controlling for industry and region does not change the picture
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Figure 3.2: Wage component and injury risk, industry x firmsize x region categories
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beta = .0049 ; t−value = 2.0
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Average injury risk
beta = 0 ; t−value = 0
Notes: Vertical axis measures wage components, horizontal axis measures
injury risk. Both measures are aggregated on (plant size)x(region)x(industry)
cells for firms with less than 50 observations within the observation period.
For larger firms both measures are aggregated on the firm level. There are
11,134 different risk relevant categories.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD and AUVA.
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qualitatively. Just like before, the risk-coefficient in the firm-wage regressions is of similar
magnitude as the one in the standard OLS-regression whereas the worker-wage regressions
reveals a much weaker relationship. In this sense, the result that most of the variation
between wages and risks is captured by wage-differences between firms seems confirmed.
In quantitative terms, the coefficients are now somewhat lower with an implied value of
a statistical injury of about 10,000 Euros ($14,000).
In sum, the result that the firm-wage but not the worker wage are closely associated
with workplace risks is consistent with the theory of compensating wage differentials.
Quantitatively, the risk-coefficients on the order of 0.0035 to 0.0056 in the firm-effect
regression imply an estimate of the value of a statistical injury of about 9,000 to 14,000
Euros ($13,000 to $20,000). We do not find a strong relationship between a worker’s
ability (as measured by the worker wage effect) and the choice of riskiness of one’s work
environment. The small (but significant) positive correlation between the worker wage-
effect and the workplace injury risk does not indicate support for the hypothesis that
high-wage workers choose safer jobs.
Firm risk, worker risk, and sorting Our linked firm-worker data set allows us to go
one step further in exploring the sorting mechanism. As our data lets us construct the
sequence of a worker’s accidents, we can identify which worker suffered a workplace injury
at which firm. Hence we can decompose the incidence of observed injuries into an effect
that is attributable to the firm and an effect that is attributable to the worker. To identify
the risks attached to the firm (”firm-risk”) and risks associated with the characteristics
or the behavior of workers (”worker-risk”) we use the same procedure as we applied in
the decomposition of wages (see last section).
One reason why we do not find that richer workers choose safer workplaces could be
that workers differ in their attitudes towards risk (and/or their ability to cope with risk).
In that case, sorting of high-wage workers to low-risk jobs occurs along with a sorting
mechanism that to risky workplaces of workers with respect to the workers risk-relevant
behavior. When high-wage workers are less risk-averse and/or are more able to cope with
risks, the sorting of workers along the productivity-dimension competes with the sorting
of workers along the risk-dimension. In fact, if sorting along the risk-dimension is the
dominant one we may find that high-risk (and high-wage) workers are found in the more
risky jobs.
To explore the sorting issue further we now make use also of the estimated risk effects
for firms and workers. The regressions in table 3.5 now include two risk variables: one
that indicates the risk attributable to the firm and another one that indicates the risk at-
tributable to the worker. The risk-indicators for larger firms are identical to the estimated
firm-risk effect. The risk-indicators for smaller firms are aggregated to the industry-region
cells. The estimated worker-risk effects are not meaningful at the individual level and are
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therefore aggregated to the firm/labor market cell in which the worker is employed.
In column 1 we again use the log wage as the dependent variable. It turns out that
the firm-risk is positively correlated with the observed wage. Moreover, we also find that
the worker-risk component is positively correlated with the worker’s wage. Column 2 uses
the firm-wage as the dependent variable. We find that there is a positive and significant
relationship between firm-wage and firm-risk. The two variables represent the building
block of the theory of compensating wage differentials. We find that the two variables are
positively and significantly correlated and of similar magnitude as the risk-coefficient in
the simple hedonic OLS wage regression of table 3.3 and the OLS regression in column 1 of
table 3.5. The firm-wage regressions of column 5 also include industry and region effects.
While this yields qualitatively very similar findings as in column 2, the point estimate is
now somewhat smaller. The firm-risk coefficients of columns 2 and 5 of 0.0053 and 0.0035
imply a statistical value of a workplace injury of similar magnitude as estimated before
(9,000-13,000 Euros / $13,000-$18,000).
Interestingly, columns 2 and 5 in table 3.5 also reveal that there is a positive and sig-
nificant relation between worker-risk and firm-wage. While there is no a priori restriction
on the sign of this coefficient, our finding indicates that high-risk workers sort them-
selves into high-wage firms. Notice that our results indicate a positive relation between
worker-risk and firm-wage holding the firm-risk constant. One possible interpretation is
that firms pay high wages not only to compensate for injury risks on the job but also
for other disamenities. Hence some firms pay better than others even when workplace
risks are held constant. If workers willing to take risky jobs are also willing to accept
other disamenities (and be compensated for them) worker-risks and firm-wages should be
positively correlated. This is exactly what we see in columns 2 and 5 of table 3.5. The
positive correlation between worker-risks and firm-wages turns out to be quite stable. No-
tice further that this sorting effect is of roughly the same magnitude as the compensating
differential with point estimates of 0.0053 and 0.0035 in columns 2 and 5, respectively.
Columns 3 and 6 of table 3.5 present the results from regressions when the worker-wage
effect is used as the dependent variable. Similar to the worker-wage regressions of table
3.4, the firm- and worker-risk coefficients in these regressions should be interpreted as
conditional correlations (rather than as an effect of risks on wages). When workers with a
higher earnings capacity select themselves into safer workplaces we should find a negative
correlation between the worker-wage and the firm-risk. The results in columns 3 and 6 do
not support this prediction. The respective coefficients are positive and significant, albeit
of a magnitude much smaller than the coefficients in the firm-wage regressions. Similarly,
we find a positive (but quantitatively small) relationship between the worker-wage and
worker-risk. Taken at face value, this means that high-productivity workers are willing
to take slightly more risk than low-productivity workers.
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3.7.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we explore the sensitivity of our results. In particular, we look at the
robustness of our results once we use a different risk measure (injury duration rather than
injury incidence); we explore whether compensating differentials and sorting mechanisms
vary across relevant segments of the labor market (industry and firm size); and whether
the level of aggregation of the various decomposed risk measures matters for our results.
Injury duration versus incidence Injury incidence may be a weak indicator as it
does not take account of the severity of a workplace accident (Hamermesh and Wolfe,
1990). Injury duration may be a better measure as the time-off work caused by an injury
is a good proxy for the severity of a workplace accident. In table 3.6, we present results
from regressions similar to those in table 3.5, using injury duration (the time-off work
induced by a workplace accident) as the relevant risk indicator. In line with the format of
previous tables, columns 1 and 4 of table 3.6 use the log wage as the dependent variable,
columns 2 and 3 (and columns 5 and 6) report regression results using, respectively, the
estimated firm-specific (and the estimated worker-specific) component of the wage as the
dependent variable.
It turns out that using time-off work induced by a workplace accident as the relevant
risk measure leads to a qualitatively similar picture. Column 2 shows that the firm-
wage is positively related to injury duration attributable to the firm; and that it is also
positively related (with similar magnitude) to the injury duration attributable to the
worker. The extended model (column 5) yields a qualitatively very similar picture. As
with the incidence variables, using injury durations as explanatory variables leads to
quantitatively somewhat smaller point estimates when industry and region effects are
allowed for.
A similar picture emerges with respect to the worker wage regressions (columns 4
and 6). Both the firm- and the worker-injury duration are positively associated with the
worker’s wage corroborating the result that sorting is not driven by higher demand for
workplace safety among workers with higher earnings capacity. In contrast, we find a
positive (albeit barely significant) correlation between firm-risk and worker-wage. Simi-
larly, the coefficient of worker-risk is positive. However, in contrast to regressions using
the injury-incidence variables, the worker-injury indicators are no longer significant, in-
dicating absence of any significant correlation between worker-risk and worker-wage.
In sum, our main results turn out to be not particularly sensitive to the risk measure
used in the hedonic wage regression.
Compensating differentials by industry and firm size Industries are not identical
with respect to the risk of a workplace injury. The construction industry is perhaps a
special case because a large fraction (about 25 percent of all male blue collar workers)
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is employed in this industry and because the injury risk in the construction industry is
disproportionately high. For this reason, it may well be that risk in the construction
industry plays a larger role in the compensation than in other industries. Table 3.7
explores this issue. In column 1, we present the risk-coefficients when the sample is
restricted to workers and firms in the construction industry; in column 2, we present the
corresponding coefficients from a sample based on non-construction workers and firms.
Notice that the coefficients in this table are comparable to the coefficients in columns 4-6
of table 3.5, as region- (and, for the non-construction sample, also industry-) dummies
are included in the regressions.
Table 3.7 confirms that the compensation for injury risks in the construction industry
is different from the non-construction industries. In the firm-wage regressions (panel B),
we find that the coefficient of firm-risk is 0.0047 in the sample of construction workers but
only 0.003 in the sample of non-construction workers. This implies that the value of statis-
tical injury is roughly 30 percent higher in the construction industry than economy-wide.
This is to some extent due to the fact that a typical workplace injury in the construction
industry is more severe (i.e. lasts roughly 10 percent longer) than a typical workplace
injury in other industries. Notice also that in two respects the finding both in construc-
tion and non-construction industries confirm our previous estimates. First, the firm-risk
effect on firm wages is almost identical as in the standard OLS equation confirming that
the cross-sectional relationship between workplace injuries and wages is largely driven by
compensation for injury risks. Second, we also find that the correlations between wage-
effects and risk-effects are quite similar as in the previous equations. In particular, our
results are consistent with the same mechanisms that sorts high-risk workers into high-
wage firms as in our previous results. In particular, we find that high-risk workers are
found in high-wage firms: this suggests that high-risk (construction and non-construction)
workers are also willing to accept other workplace disamenities (and be compensated for
them).
In the worker-wage regressions (panel C) we find that the conditional correlation be-
tween firm-risk and worker-wage and between worker-risk and worker-wage is significantly
positive in the construction industry but absent in non-construction industries. One rea-
son for this result could be that the higher prevalence of injury risks in the construction
industry implies a higher importance of injury risk considerations in job- and mobility-
choices. In contrast, in non-construction industries workplace (dis)amenities (other than
injury risks) play a relatively more important role so that the sorting of workers across
workplaces is strongest driven by considerations unrelated to the risk of workplace injuries.
A related issue is whether the compensation of workplace injuries is similar across
large and small firms. It is a well established fact that larger firms pay better than
smaller firms but the reason for this size-differential is rather controversial. An important
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Table 3.7: Wages and injury risk, construction vs. non construction
construction non construction
A. ln(wage rate)
Firm risk component 0.0064⋆⋆⋆ 0.0032⋆⋆⋆
(11.25) (5.64)
Worker risk component 0.0062⋆⋆⋆ 0.0031⋆⋆⋆
(10.70) (5.19)
R2 0.111 0.287
B. Firm wage component
Firm risk component 0.0047⋆⋆⋆ 0.0031⋆⋆⋆
(10.62) (6.44)
Worker risk component 0.0046⋆⋆⋆ 0.0030⋆⋆⋆
(9.63) (5.94)
R2 0.074 0.230
C. Worker wage component
Firm risk component 0.0016⋆⋆⋆ 0.0001
(5.15) (0.43)
Worker risk component 0.0016⋆⋆⋆ 0.0001
(4.80) (0.31)
R2 0.021 0.063
Time dummies YES YES
Region dummies YES YES
Industry dummies - YES
Observations 648,676 2,197,094
Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% level respectively. Robust t-values in
parentheses. Injury risk is aggregated on (plant size)x(region)x(industry) cells for firms with less than
50 observations within the observation period. For larger firms the injury risk is aggregated on the
firm level. There are 11,134 different risk relevant categories.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD and AUVA.
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hypothesis states that problems of asymmetric information are more prevalent in larger
firms and hence compensation is to a larger extent driven by wage policy mechanisms that
try to solve incentive problems arising from these information asymmetries. Inter alia,
this may lead to labor market equilibria where utilities across jobs are no longer equalized
and the strict relationship between workplace risks and wages, that emerges under perfect
labor markets, does no longer emerge with labor market imperfections. In other words,
compensation for workplace (dis)amenities play a relatively more important role in smaller
firms where the market forces have more direct impact on the determination of earnings. A
similar argument, perhaps equally important in the Austrian context, implies that wages
in larger firms are stronger determined by union power and rent sharing than in smaller
firms where workers are less strongly unionized (or where the threat of unionization is less
prevalent). While the presence of unions does not imply that compensation for workplace
amenities becomes irrelevant (Duncan and Stafford, 1980), union power and the resulting
changes in labor relations within the firm may alter firm wage policies in ways that
dominate the importance of compensation of workplace risks.
Table 3.8 divides the sample into small and large firms. More precisely, the sample is
split up into firms with less than 500 employees (about 80 percent of observations) and
firms with more than 500 employees (20 percent of observations). In line with the above
arguments, the results show that compensation for workplace injuries is confined to smaller
firms. The coefficients in the small-firm sample are very similar to the results in table 3.5
(extended model, column 4-6) both with respect to the compensating differential (effect of
firm-risk in the firm-wage equation) and with respect to sorting (the remaining coefficients
in panels A and B). In contrast, the coefficients of all risk-variables are insignificant in
the large-firm sample.
Aggregation of risk measures As a final sensitivity test, we look at the relevance
of possible measurement errors that may result by construction of our risk indicators.
As mentioned above, both worker- and firm-risk variables are measured at the firm-
level for larger firms (with 50 employment observations or more) while these measures
are proxied by industry-region labor market cells for smaller firms (with less than 50
employment observations). Although this variable has the advantage of processing the
detailed information on individual (firm and worker) injury incidence, it may still be too
noisy calling for a higher aggregation level. Alternatively, aggregating to industry-region
market has some element of arbitrariness and disregards (potentially relevant) information
that would be available at more disaggregated levels. This means we need to check how
sensitive our results are with respect to the aggregation level at which we measure the
risk-exposure and the risk-behavior of workers. In theory, the appropriate level of risk-
exposure is the firm. In practice, using injury events as a proxy for a worker’s injury risk is
only reasonable for large firms. For smaller firms, the time-period over which we measure
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Table 3.8: Wages and injury risk, large firms vs. small firms
plant size < 500 plant size ≥ 500
A. ln(wage rate)
Firm risk component 0.0046⋆⋆⋆ −0.0012
(13.79) (−0.38))
Worker risk component 0.0045⋆⋆⋆ −0.0013
(12.92) (−0.44)
R2 0.249 0.365
B. Firm wage component
Firm risk component 0.0039⋆⋆⋆ −0.0012
(14.73) (−0.53)
Worker risk component 0.0038⋆⋆⋆ −0.0012
(13.50) (−0.49)
R2 0.207 0.594
C. Worker wage component
Firm risk component 0.0006⋆⋆⋆ 0.0001
(3.48) (0.08)
Worker risk component 0.0007⋆⋆⋆ −0.0001
(3.34) (−0.05)
R2 0.046 0.120
Time dummies YES YES
Region dummies YES YES
Industry dummies YES YES
Observations 2,383,335 462,435
Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% level respectively. Robust t-values in paren-
theses. Injury risk is aggregated on (plant size)x(region)x(industry) cells for firms with less than 50
observations within the observation period. For larger firms the injury risk is aggregated on the firm
level. There are 11,134 different risk relevant categories.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD and AUVA.
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injury events is simply too short. Whether or not an injury takes place is determined
by bad or good luck, and actual injury outcomes may be a poor proxy for actual injury
risks. In order to test, how sensitive our results are with respect to the particular risk
measure, we use four additional risk measures, based on alternative aggregation levels, to
proxy the worker’s injury risk. Table 3.9 presents the results.
Column 1 of table 3.9 reproduces results from the highest level of aggregation, i.e.
when the firm- and worker-effects are aggregated to two-digit industries leading to 36 dif-
ferent labor market segments (so that the risk-indicators can take one of only 36 different
values); column 2 divides segments further into firm-size classes (-14, 15-49, 50-99, 100-
499, 500+ employees) within industries which lets us end up with 167 labor market cells
(in 13 of the 36 · 5 = 180 potential cells there are no firms); column 3 divides segments
further into regions (more than 120 political districts) leading to 1,277 labor market cells;
column 4 repeats the results of table 3.5 which are based on 11,134 labor market cells;
finally, column 5 is based on estimated firm-specific risk measures without any further
aggregation leading to 62,479 different values for the risk indicator.
From table 3.9 it becomes clear that the level of aggregation does not affect our main
results qualitatively. In all firm-wage regressions of panel A the firm-risk coefficients have
a positive sign and are statistically significant (albeit only at the 10 percent level when
we use the very coarse industry classification of columns 1). However, we see that the
aggregation level of the risk-measure affects our results quantitatively. In particular, the
point estimate of firm risk in the firm-wage equation is somewhat larger than with a higher
aggregation level of the risk measure (columns 1 and 2). In columns 3 to 5 we disaggregate
the risk measure by region and use firm-specific information, the point-estimates become
somewhat smaller. There may be two reasons for this. On the one hand, the industry
classification may be too coarse which leads to an upward bias in the compensating
differential (Lalive, 2003). On the other hand, the firm-classification may be too fine,
so that for small firms observed injury incidences are not informative on the true injury
risk. In other words, for small firms the firm-specific, which is flawed by measurement
error and the risk-coefficient, is biased towards zero. The firm-risk coefficient in the firm-
wage equation is 0.002 when the risk-indicator is measured at the firm-level (column 5)
and is indeed the smallest among all coefficients in table 3.9. With higher aggregation
levels it is between 0.0035 (firm-level classification for larger firms, industry-size region
cells for smaller firms, column 4) and 0.006 (industry-size-region classification, column
3). Our preferred estimate where firm-specific risk measures are used for large firms and
the auxiliary industry-size-region segments are used only for smaller firms produces an
estimate of 0.0035. For obvious reasons, the measurement bias is of minor importance
when risk is measured at the industry level whereas aggregation bias is zero when risk
is measured at the firm-level. Hence we conclude that our intermediate measure where
we avoid aggregation bias by exploiting firm information and at the same time avoid
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measurement bias by aggregating small firms to industry-size-region labor market cells
should keep the bias in the estimated compensating differential small. In sum, our result
that firm-wages are positively and significantly affected by firm-risk turns out robust
and independent of the particular aggregation level. We consistently find a positive and
significant relationship between the building blocks of the theory of compensating wage
differentials: firm-risks and firm-wages.
We also consistently find a positive conditional correlation between worker-risk and
firm-wages, suggesting that workers willing to take higher risks are sorted into workplaces
that are associated with (and compensate) other disamenities. Only when we aggregate
worker-risks to the industry level, such an effect does not materialize. Finally, irrespective
of the aggregation level, the relationship between risk indicators is much smaller in the
worker-wage regressions (panel B) than the risk-effects in the firm-wage equations (panel
A). In particular, we find that worker-wage and firm-risk are positively correlated contra-
dicting the hypothesis that workers with higher earnings capacity choose safer workplaces.
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented new evidence on compensating wage differentials for
injury risks. Using linked firm-worker data not only reporting workers employment and
earning histories but also the worker’s histories of workplace injuries at various employ-
ers. This allows us to identify the building blocks of the theory of compensating wage
differentials: the firm-specific components of wages and risk. The risk of a workplace
injury results from the interplay between the risk inherent in the workplace (firm-risk)
and the risk-relevant behavior for the worker (worker-risk) by which we mean the workers’
willingness to take risks and/or the workers’ ability to avoid risk at the workplace. The
theory of compensating wage differentials states that workers subject to higher workplace
injury risks should earn higher wages. In contrast, workers should not be compensated
for innate risky behavior due to, for instance, low risk aversion and/or lack of dexterity,
precaution, or diligence.
Our empirical strategy decomposes observed wages and workplace injuries into firm
and worker components using econometric techniques developed by (Abowd et al., 2002).
Hence our empirical strategy has added two elements to existing studies. First, by iden-
tifying the relationship between firm-wage and workplace-injury risks it identifies the
building blocks of the theory and provides empirical estimates for the hedonic wage func-
tion that go one step further than existing studies. Second, by identifying the wage- and
risk-components attached to the worker, our results also shed new light on the sorting of
worker-types across workplaces that differ in (dis)amenities.
Our empirical analysis produces several interesting results. First, our analysis based
on firm- and worker-specific risk indicators lead to an estimated compensating wage dif-
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ferential that is quite similar to the one obtained from a standard cross-sectional hedonic
wage equation. Regressing individual wages on aggregate industry (or occupational) in-
jury risk yields an implied value of a statistical (non-fatal) injury of about $20,000. This is
on the lower side of the range of $20,000 to $70,000 found in samples from other industrial-
ized countries (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). Second, the estimated compensating differential
(and the estimated value of a statistical injury) remains unchanged when we focus on the
building blocks of the theory. Regressing the firm-specific wage on firm-specific risks, we
find a compensating wage differential that is of roughly equal size than the one obtained in
the standard cross-sectional wage regression. This result turns out quite robust. We also
find that our results remain unchanged when we use the expected days off work (rather
the expected number of injuries) as the relevant risk indicator. We also find some het-
erogeneity in the compensating differential across industries. In particular, smaller firms
and firms in the construction industry compensate risks stronger than average. Third, our
empirical strategy also allows us to shed new light on the sorting of workers across firms
that offer different workplace (dis)amenities. We find no evidence in favor of a sorting of
high-productivity workers into low-risk jobs. This suggests that the bias of the compen-
sating differential obtained from a standard cross-sectional hedonic wage function that is
due to unobserved productivity of workers is small. However, we find that, conditional on
firm-risk, high-risk worker sort themselves into high-wage jobs. This is consistent with a
explanations that workers who are willing to take high risks also accept other workplace
disamenities (and be compensated for them).
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3.A Appendix
This appendix discusses the estimation algorithm. The least squares estimator of β, θ and
ψ solves the following normal equations


X ′X X ′D X ′F
D′X D′D D′F

















It is not possible to invert the cross-product matrix due to the large number of person
and firm effects and due to computer memory constraints. In this chapter we apply a
modified version of the iterative gradient method proposed in Abowd et al. (2002) to find
the solution to the normal equations. The idea of this estimator is simple. Rearranging










X ′(y −Dθ − Fψ)
D′(y −Xβ − Fψ)
F ′(y −Xβ −Dθ)

 (3.6)
These are four blocks of normal equations that yield the required least squares solution
given the least squares solution of the remaining three sets of parameters.
The iteration protocol is as follows. Choose starting values β0, θ0 and ψ0. Let l index
iterations. Solve for βl, θl, and ψl using (3.6) based on the estimate of the other parameters










[X ′X]−1X ′(y −Dθl−1 − Fψl−1)
[D′D]−1D′(y −Xβl − Fψl−1)
[F ′F ]−1 F ′(y −Xβl −Dθl)

 (3.7)
Intuitively, the current estimate of β, for instance, is found by regressing the residuals
y −Dθl−1 − Fψl−1 on the matrix X.
The algorithm is partially recursive in using the fact that the current value of β, βl
can already be used in estimating θl. In estimating ψl, the current values of βl and θl are
used to form the residuals, etc. The algorithm converges to the true least squares solution
because parameter updates are chosen to fulfill the normal equations given the values of
the other parameters. We determine convergence to be achieved when the absolute change
in the sum of squared errors between iteration l and l − 1 falls below 1 · 10−11.
Moreover, Abowd et al. (2002) show that it is necessary to identify connected groups
of firms and workers in the data set. A connected group is defined as the set of firms and
workers such that every worker in the set is connected to every other worker in the set
by at least one move (either directly or indirectly) between their respective employers.
Within a connected group, the model identifies all worker effects and firm effects up to one
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effect in each dimension. In the empirical analysis we focus on the largest group (group 1)
which covers more than 85 % of all observations, more than 85 % of all workers, and more
than 55 % of all firms. (Smaller groups typically consist of one worker being employed
with the same one person firm in the entire sample period.) We normalize all effects such
that they can be interpreted as the deviation of the firm effect from the average firm effect
in the group.
We apply this procedure separately, to the log of daily earnings wit, and the risk of





& the Value of a Statistical Injury
joint with Andreas Kuhn
”The value of life is not in the length of days,
but in the use we make of them;
a man may live long yet very little.”
Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592), French writer and philosopher
4.1 Introduction
It has long been recognized in economics that differences in wages are not only due to the
fact that individuals differ in their productivity–relevant characteristics (e.g. education),
but also due to the fact that the jobs offered to workers differ enormously along various di-
mensions (workplace safety being only one important example). Workers presumably not
only value the monetary payoff from working, but also the non–monetary characteristics,
potentially giving rise to compensating wage differentials (Rosen, 1986). This means firms
offering jobs with ”negative” characteristics, that is, attributes to which workers attach
a negative value, must attract workers by paying them higher wages ceteris paribus, thus
”compensating” them for the negative aspects of the job (and vice versa for ”positive”
workplace characteristics). Non–monetary characteristics of jobs are of course manifold,
most empirical studies though focus on workplace safety, that is on the risk compensation
for both fatal and non–fatal accidents (e.g. Viscusi and Aldy, 2003).
65
4.1. Introduction Compensating Wage Differentials
The theory of compensating wage differentials has inspired a huge number of empirical
studies trying to pin down the compensation for undesirable workplace attributes. Due to
the implicit trade–off between job amenities and wages, observed (or rather, estimated)
compensating wage differentials can be used to assess the value of a statistical life or
injury, respectively. These empirical results in turn may directly influence public policy,
since cost–benefit analyses with respect to safety regulations need empirical assessments
on the monetary value of such regulations (this applies not only to regulations of safety
at the workplace, but also to environmental regulations for example).
Yet, the intuitive appeal of the theory notwithstanding, empirical studies face some
fundamental problems concerning the identification of compensating wage differentials.
The main problem is rooted in unobserved productivity differences between individuals
and the thereupon based sorting of workers into jobs with different risks (due to the
positive income elasticity of the value of a statistical accident). This presumably explains
the rather large variation in the estimated compensation for risks on the one hand, but
also the fact that many empirical studies report no compensation for risk or even report
compensating wage differentials having the ”wrong” sign (at least with respect to non–
fatal injury risks). For example, the survey by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) reports a rather
wide range of estimates for the value of a statistical injury from about $20,000 to $70,000
(for the United States only).
This chapter presents empirical evidence on the compensation for non–fatal accident
risk in Switzerland, using a data set compiled from two different sources (which we will dis-
cuss in detail below). Our study has three main features. First, we will exclusively focus
on non–fatal accidents. This focus reflects the fact that most accidents have (fortunately)
non–fatal consequences and thus, from the viewpoint of public health and safety, merit
the most attention.1 In the year 2004 (the year of our empirical analysis), for example,
the Swiss Accident Insurance Fund reports about 246,000 non–fatal accidents related to
work but only 188 fatal accidents. Second, we observe the number of non–fatal accidents
not only within entire industries, but also within cells defined by industry×skill–level of
the job. This is a tremendous advantage from an empirical point of view, since risks
at (too) high levels of aggregation mix the risks of very different groups of workers and
different willingness to pay for avoiding risk, which might lead to biased estimation of
the compensation for risk in the workplace. Third, we capitalize on the availability of
longitudinal wage information, which allows us to use simple panel estimation methods
in order to isolate the firm wage component. We believe that our empirical approach, on
the one hand using the number of non–fatal accidents within narrower cells than usually
available, and on the other hand combining panel data estimation methods with sim-
ple non–parametric stratification, transcends the typical hedonic wage function approach
1Our focus though is also due to the available data on non–fatal accidents as well as the empirical
approach we take, as we will discuss in detail in section 4.3 and section 4.4 below.
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often used in the literature on the subject.
The main findings of our empirical analysis are the following. First, we find that
a simple hedonic wage regression, where the observed log wage is regressed on the risk
measure (and additional control variables) yields a compensation for non–fatal accident
risk which is statistically zero, a result that is in line with some previous empirical studies.
The leading explanation for this result (which runs counter to theory) is presumably the
sorting of workers which differ in their unobserved productivity. Second, moving on to,
in a sense, more sophisticated (but, we believe, in this case also more reliable) methods,
we find a positive point estimate for the compensation of non–fatal accident risk. Our
preferred point estimate yields an implicit value of a statistical injury of about 40,000
Swiss francs (which lies well within the range given by studies from the U.S. labor market,
as well as from studies outside the U.S.). On the other hand, using different estimation
methods yields considerably different values for the value of a statistical injury. As we
will discuss later, a significant cause of this wide range of estimates is the difference in the
estimation methods used. Third, comparing the different estimation methods may shed
some light on the problem of endogenous sorting of workers into jobs with different risks,
which presumably yields biased estimates for the compensation of risk. Our results are in
fact in line with the argument supported by Hwang et al. (1992), among others, that such
endogenous sorting gives rise to severe underestimation of risk compensation. Fourth,
we find significant differences between men and women on the one hand, and between
smaller and larger firms on the other hand with respect to the compensation of non–fatal
accident risk. Fifth and finally, our results also show that the kind of risk–data available
can make an important difference for the empirical assessment of risk compensation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We start with a discussion of the
relevant literature on compensating wage differentials, focusing on empirical studies esti-
mating the compensation for non–fatal accident risk. In section 4.3, we discuss the two
data sources we rely on, discuss the construction of the variables of main interest – along
with some descriptive statistics. We then expore issues of identification and estimation
in section 4.4. Specifically, we will discuss three different approaches to identification and
estimation. We start with a simple hedonic wage regression model, where the wage is
simply regressed on individual– and firm–specific characteristics. The second approach
is based on the idea that we can control for unobserved heterogeneity of individuals by
appropriately stratifying the sample. The third approach we take capitalizes on the lon-
gitudinal structure of the wage data. We isolate the wage component, which is specific
to the firm and then use only this part of the wage to estimate risk compensation. The
results of the different estimation methods are presented and discussed in section 4.4.
Based on our econometric results, we further present estimates of the value of a statistical
(non–fatal) accident in Switzerland. Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Related Literature
4.2.1 Compensation for Workplace Accident Risk
There is a large number of empirical studies which try to pin down the compensation for
accident risks, as well as for a wide range of other job amenities and disamenities (the
surveys by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) and Viscusi (1993) are of special interest here; see
also the more recent, but less thorough survey by Ashenfelter (2006)).2 Most empirical
studies find a positive compensation for fatal accident risk, often yielding high implicit
values of a statistical life. For example, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) report that half of the
studies from the U.S. labor market surveyed in their article give a value of a statistical
life within the range of $3.8–$9.0 million (in 2000 dollars), the median estimate being
about $7 million. Most studies from outside the U.S. labor market give estimates within
the same range. It is difficult to assess the exact reasons for this wide range of estimates,
since the studies differ in various ways, for example with respect to the available data and
risk measure3, or in the econometric methods applied.
The evidence on the compensation for non–fatal accident risk is much less coherent,
which is somewhat surprising since most studies that present estimates of such compen-
sation are based on the same data as estimates for the compensation for fatal accident
risk. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) report, for both the U.S. as well as other labor markets, a
probable range for the value of a statistical injury of about $20,000–$70,000 per injury.
4.2.2 Endogenous Sorting
The main problem from the empirical point of view is the potential sorting of workers into
jobs differing in their risk of accidents. Hwang et al. (1992), among others, argue that
the problem of main concern are differences in unobservables which in turn relate to the
productivity of workers and thus may lead to sorting of workers into jobs with different
risks. The sorting of workers in turn is endogenous due to the fact that the income
elasticity of the value of a statistical life or injury is positive, i.e. more productive workers
sort themselves into less risky jobs by accepting ceteris paribus lower wages. Viscusi and
Aldy (2003), for example, report an income elasticity of about 0.5–0.6. On the other hand
though, Shogren and Stamland (2002) argue that the bias in estimating the compensating
wage differential could run in the other direction, assuming that workers not only differ
2Compensating wage differentials have also been found, for example, for the risk of unemployment
(Moretti, 2000; Lalive et al., 2006), for shift work (Kostiuk, 1990), and uncertainty with respect to future
earnings (Feinberg, 1981).
3Most importantly perhaps, some studies rely not on direct measures of risk (i.e. number of accidents),
but base their analyses on tradeoffs outside the labor market, e.g. on the tradeoff between traffic accidents
and the price of automobiles (Dreyfus and Viscusi, 1995) or fatalities related to bicycle accidents and the
prize of bicycle helmets (Jenkins et al., 2001). Other studies have used subjective assessments of risk, as
for example Viscusi and O’Connor (1984) and Viscusi and Hersch (2001).
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in their productivity, but also with respect to their skill in avoiding accidents. Thus,
workers in risky jobs could be either more tolerant to risk or more skilled in avoiding
risk (or both). Thus they show that the estimated risk compensation might actually be
upward biased, rather than downward biased.
Some studies have tried to approach the problem of endogenous sorting by using
instrumental variables (Garen, 1988; DeLeire and Levy, 2004, for example,). The study
by Garen (1988), for example, tries to correct for the endogeneity of job risk by using a
system of simultaneous equations where marital status and the number of dependents are
used as instruments for the preference over risk.
4.2.3 Measurement of Risk
Another empirical issue concerns the measurement of the risk of an accident. First, as
pointed out by Mellow and Sider (1983) for example, typical survey data are more often
than not plagued by measurement error, i.e. it seems to be the case that workers often
misreport their industry affiliation and/or their exact occupation. Assuming that this
kind of measurement error is random, this causes the compensating differential to be
biased towards zero. Second, there clearly is a trade–off of the following form. On the
one hand, risk measurements at a low level of aggregation are preferred, as otherwise one
might mix workers with very different occupations into the same risk categories. On the
other hand though, risk measures at a low aggregation level run into the problem that
many cells will have zero risk, at least for shorter periods of time. This is specifically true
for fatal accident risk, yet obviously also applies to non–fatal injuries.
4.2.4 Estimation
The most prevalent approach in the empirical literature is via estimation of hedonic
wage functions, that is, by running regressions of the wage on characteristics of both
the workers and jobs. As we will make explicit in section 4.4, this approach is likely to
fail identification because it is unlikely that this approach can effectively deal with the
problem of endogenous sorting of workers into jobs (as pointed out above, some studies
have tried to instrument endogenous sorting by using family characteristics).
As we will discuss in detail in section 4.4 below, our empirical approach of choice
relies on the panel structure of the wage data. Thus, our study also relates to work on
matched employer–employee data (e.g. Abowd and Kramarz, 1999) as well as the panel
data estimation methods in general (e.g. Wooldridge, 2002). We cannot directly apply the
methods of Abowd and Kramarz (1999) though, because our wage data has a longitudinal
structure only with respect to the employer, but not with respect to the individual worker.
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4.2.5 Empirical Evidence for Switzerland
To the best of our knowledge, there is only a single published study on the compensation
of accident risk for Switzerland by Baranzini and Ferro-Luzzi (2001), focusing on fatal
accident risk only. They report estimates for the value of a statistical life ranging from
about 12 to about 32 million Swiss francs. Besides having a different focus (our focus
in on non–fatal accident risk only), our study differs in at least two further ways. First,
we have access to the number of non–fatal accidents not only within industries, but
within narrower cells, defined over industry×skill–level of the job. Second, we do not
primarily and exclusively rely on simple hedonic wage regressions for the estimation of
risk compensation, instead we use the longitudinal structure of the wage information in
a first stage in order to deal with the endogenous sorting of workers.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Data Sources
We use two different data sources. The first data source is the Swiss Wage Struc-
ture Survey (SWSS; ”Lohnstrukturerhebung (LSE)”), which is a biannual survey among
firms which is administered and made available by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
The SWSS is one of the two largest official surveys in Switzerland focused mainly on
employment–relevant information.4 The SWSS is a survey of firms, covering the popula-
tion of large firms along with a random sample of small firms. We use three different waves
of the SWSS (from the years 2000, 2002, and 2004) and we extract individual monthly
earnings along with several individual–specific characteristics (see section 4.3.4 below) on
details.
Our risk measure corresponds to the number of non–fatal accidents within cells de-
fined over industry (forty different industries on a two–digit level) and skill–level of the
job (four different levels). The data have been provided by the Swiss Accident Insur-
ance Fund (SAIF; ”Schweizerische Unfallversicherungsanstalt (Suva)”), which is the most
important accident insurance fund in Switzerland. The number of non–fatal accidents
within industry×skill–level cells are available for the year 2004.
4The second important labor market survey is the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS; ”Schweizerische
Arbeitskräfteerhebung (SAKE)”). The two main advantages of using the SWSS over the SLFS are the
following: First, the SWSS allows isolating the wage firm fixed effect, which is the part of the observed
wage where risk compensation should show up. Second, the SWSS is (opposed to the SLFS) mailed to
employers, and thus misclassification of occupations and industries should only be of minimal order (the
same is arguably true for wages).
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4.3.2 Definitions
One of the main features of our analysis is that our risk measure rk gives the number of
non–fatal accidents per year and per 1,000 workers within a given industry×skill–level cell
k (instead of within–industry only). Data on the absolute number of non–fatal accidents
for the year 2004 is available within cells defined over industry×skill–level of job. Now,
because the SAIF does not directly have the number of workers within these cells and
because workers are not uniformly distributed over these cells, we also need to know the
distribution of workers over these cells in order to compute the risk of a non–fatal accident.
To this end, we simply use the distribution of workers in the SWSS (from the year 2004),
and then approximate the population distribution of workers by multiplying the number
of workers within a given cell with the total number of workers which are covered by the
SAIF (about 1.827 millions in the year 2004).
Note that there is a fundamental trade–off with respect to the risk measure chosen:
On the one hand, risk measures on a highly disaggregated level are preferred, such that
we do not pool accident risks of individuals working in very different occupations and
jobs. This has been pointed at, for example, by Viscusi (1993, p.1928), noting that ”[t]he
main deficiency of industry–based data is that they pertain to industry–wide averages
and do not distinguish among the different jobs within that industry [...]”. On the other
hand, accidents observed at a very low level of aggregation also give rise to estimation
problems, because the number of accidents tends towards zero for most cells if we shrink
the size of the risk–relevant cells. That, in fact, is the reason why we decided not to use
the information about fatal accidents for this study. Disaggregating the number of fatal
accidents over the skill–level of job actually yields far too many cells with zero number of
accidents.
The SWSS includes average gross monthly wages for full–time employment (i.e. 172
hours per month), including mandatory social security contributions and extra pay (e.g.
for night work, 13. monthly wage). The SWSS also includes several socio–demographic
characteristics (e.g. age, gender, tenure, educational attainment (highest degree), citizen-
ship), but also different firm characteristics (most importantly, the size of the firm along
with the geographic location).
4.3.3 Measurement Error
One main advantage of our data is that measurement error in the risk data and industry–
affiliation of workers is arguably of minor significance (as already mentioned in section
4.2, Mellow and Sider (1983) have pointed out the problem of misclassification of both
industry and occupation). This is important because measurement error in the risk vari-
able tends to bias the compensating wage differential towards zero (measurement error in
the dependent variable (i.e. wage) is, of course, also common but of less concern). We are
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confident that the measurement error for both our risk measure and industry–affiliation is
of no great importance, since the SWSS does not involve employees but obtains the data
from the employer directly (such that misclassification of either industry and/or occupa-
tion is unlikely to occur). For the same reason, we also believe that our wage information
is more reliable than the information available in typical survey data (although presum-
ably less reliable than administrative data). Additionally, our risk measure is directly
obtained from administrative sources and should thus cover all relevant accidents.
4.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for both the overall sample as well as the sample
of individuals in jobs of the lowest skill–level (that will be used in the empirical analysis
discussed below). In both samples, we only consider workers aged between 16 and 64 (for
men) and between 16 and 61 (for women). A second restriction applies to the size of the
employer. Because we are estimating wage fixed effects for each firm, we also restrict the
sample to workers from firms which have at least ten workers in each of the four job skill–
levels in each year. The overall sample includes more than one million individual workers,
the subsample of workers in the lowest skill–level (with respect to the job, not with respect
to the educational attainment of the worker) consists of about 300,000 individual workers.
In both cases, there are about 3,500 different firms (due to the restriction on firms). As
we will discuss in–depth in section 4.4 below, our preferred estimation approach will focus
exclusively on workers within a given skill–level as collected in the SWSS, as we believe
that such a stratification of the workers yields more reliable estimates of the compensating
wage differential.
We begin with describing the overall sample, which is representative of the Swiss labor
market as a whole. The typical worker in the Swiss labor market has gross earnings equal
to 6,300 Swiss francs a month, is about 40 years old and has about 9.5 years of tenure and
is more likely to be a man. The average employer has more than 2,800 workers (reflecting
the sampling structure of the SWSS as well as the restriction with respect to the selection
of the employers). About two thirds of the workers are married, the other third single. The
distribution of workers with respect to educational attainment highlights two important
characteristics of the Swiss labor market in terms of education. First, compared to other
countries, the number of workers with tertiary education is rather low (e.g. only about
5.5% of the workers have a university degree). Second, about half of the workers hold
a vocational training. Another important characteristic of the Swiss labor market is the
large fraction (about 20%) of workers without Swiss citizenship.
Focusing on individuals working in jobs with the lowest skill–level (columns 3 and 4 of
table 4.1) yields the expected result that some groups are overrepresented in the analysis
sample relative to the overall sample of individuals (although this subset of individuals
is similar to the overall sample with respect to some characteristics, for example age and
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Skill-level 1 Skill-level 1-4
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Monthly wage 4526.63 1069.26 6371.88 3466.72
Natural logarithm of monthly wage 8.39 0.23 8.68 0.38
Non fatal accident risk (per 1,000 workers) 45.40 59.13 93.01 150.42
Age 40.19 11.66 40.71 11.14
Female 0.54 0.50 0.42 0.49
Tenure 7.63 8.18 9.06 9.12
Size of the firm 2714.94 7820.84 3108.01 7890.73
Marital status
Single 0.27 0.44 0.32 0.47
Married 0.62 0.49 0.58 0.49
Others 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30
Education
University degree 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.23
College of higher education 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.21
Higher professional degree 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.26
Teachers’ certificate 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.07
High School 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14
Finished professional education 0.27 0.45 0.50 0.50
Firm intern professional education 0.14 0.34 0.07 0.25
Secondary school 0.48 0.50 0.18 0.38
Other degree 0.08 0.28 0.05 0.22
Citizenship
Swiss citizenship 0.52 0.50 0.68 0.47
Short tem residence authorization 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.08
Long term residence authorization 0.08 0.28 0.05 0.23
Permanent recidence permit 0.29 0.45 0.17 0.37
Cross-border commuter 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25
Others 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.16
Geographic region
VD, VS, GE 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37
BE, FR, SO, NE, JU 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41
BS, BL, AG 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35
ZH 0.24 0.42 0.27 0.44
GL, SH, AR, AI, SG, GR, TG 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32
LU, UR, SZ, OW, NW, ZG 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26
TI 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18
Number of Firms 3,533 3,533
Number of Observation 130,976 468,328
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 refer to the subsample of workers in jobs of lowest skill–level, columns 3 and
4 to the full sample of workers. Sources: All variables are taken from the SWSS, except the number of
non–fatal accidents. Risk measure gives the number of non–fatal accidents per 1,000 workers per year,
within cells over industry×skill–level. Own calculations, based on SWSS (2004) and SAIF (2004).
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size or the geographic location of the employer).5 Here, average monthly earnings are only
about 70% of the overall average earnings (about 4,500 Swiss francs). Moreover, a worker
from skill–level four is more likely to be a woman, more likely to be married and much
more likely not to have Swiss citizenship, compared with a worker from the overall sample.
The most striking difference between the overall sample and the lowest skill–level sample
though is the distribution of workers with respect to educational attainment. As table
4.1 shows, there are practically no workers with an educational degree above vocational
training. This, in fact, is a desired result with respect to the empirical approach we
take (see section 4.4 below): Given that education (of course not exclusively) reflects
differences in productivity, focusing on workers with similar educational attainment also
implies that these workers are more similar with respect to unobserved productivity–
relevant characteristics (compared to workers from all job skill–levels). We believe that
the variance of unobserved productivity is presumably lowest within the group of workers
in the lowest skill–level (although this presumption obviously is fundamentally empirically
untestable).
As table 4.1 also shows, the typical worker in the year 2004 was faced with the risk
of a non–fatal, work–related accident of about 8.8% (88 accidents on average per 1,000
workers). In the sample of workers with lowest skill–level, the average risk was about half
(about 43 accidents per 1,000 workers). Figure 4.1 shows a simple scatterplot between
the average logarithmic monthly wage and the number of non–fatal accidents for workers
from the lowest skill–level jobs at the level of industry×skill–level. The scatterplot shows
no relation whatsoever between the two variables (if anything, the correlation goes the
”wrong” way), which is underlined by the estimated slope coefficient from a regression
of the average log earnings on the number of accidents – yielding essentially a zero point
estimate, both in economic and statistical terms (t–value is approximately zero). This
result is not especially surprising though since average wages within industries clearly
may not only reflect differences with respect to accident risks, but also differences in the
composition of workers and jobs. We thus now move on to issues of identification and
econometric estimation.
4.4 Identification and Estimation
We now discuss issues of identification and estimation of the compensating wage differen-
tial for (non–fatal) accident risk. We start with a simple hedonic wage regression of the
5The distribution of workers over the skill–level of jobs looks as follows: About 6% work in the highest
level, about 20% in the second–highest level. 46% work in skill–level 3, and the remaining 28% of the
workers are in jobs of lowest skill–level.
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Non fatal accidents for 1,000 workers
beta = −.0001 ; t−value = −.4
Notes: The y–axis shows the average logarithm of monthly gross earnings and
the number of non–fatal accidents per 1,000 workers per year. Workers in lowest
job skill–level only. Table A.1 in the chapter appendix shows the corresponding
numbers. Own calculations, based on SWSS (2004) and SAIF (2004).
following form:




jγ + δrk + uijk (4.1)
Where yijk is the natural logarithm of the gross monthly wage of individual i, working
in firm j and industry×skill–level cell k. x is a (column) vector of individual character-
istics including citizenship, educational attainment, age (and its square), tenure (and its
square), a gender–dummy and marital status. z is a (column) vector of characteristics
describing the firm (and thus reflecting the characteristics of the job), and includes the
size of the firm (and its square) and the geographical location of the firm. r is our risk
measure, corresponding to the number of non–fatal accidents in industry×skill–level cell
k per 1,000 workers in the year 2004. uijk is the unobserved error term, upon which
identification of the compensating wage differential obviously critically hinges.
α, β, γ and δ are parameters to be estimated from the sample data at hand. The
constant term α is, of course, of no special interest but simply serves the purpose of
scaling the expected value of the error term to zero. The two parameter vectors β and γ
are also, for the purpose of our analysis, of no particular interest. The parameter of main
interest is δ, which, under appropriate assumptions, corresponds to the compensating
wage differential for non–fatal accident risk.
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As explained in section 4.3, the number of non–fatal accidents is only available for a
single point in time, so that we can essentially only run a cross–sectional hedonic wage
regression6 (but we do have a partial panel structure with respect to wages, which we will
try to capitalize on later; see section 4.4.4 below).
4.4.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity and Worker Sorting
Parameter δ (as are the other parameters) is identified if we are willing to assume that:
E(u|x, z, r) = E(u) (4.2)
This means, if we can safely assume that the error term uijk is mean independent of
(x, z, r), then all the parameters of the regression given by equation (4.1) are identi-
fied. However, as has been pointed out by several authors (e.g. Hwang et al., 1992) and
discussed in section 4.2, there is good reason to act on the assumption that there is un-
observed individual heterogeneity related to wages (that is, these differences somehow
reflect differences in productivity not taken into account for by observed variables) and
that ”safety” is a normal good (i.e. the demand for ”safety” increases as income rises).
Thus, workers of high productivity sort themselves into less risky jobs by accepting lower
wages ceteris paribus. To stick with the model from equation (4.1), the hedonic wage
regression with unobserved individual heterogeneity made explicit can be written as:




jγ + δrk + θi + ǫijk (4.3)
where (θi + ǫijk) corresponds to the error term uijk in equation (4.1) whereby now we
make the problem of individual heterogeneity explicit (for simplicity, θ is rescaled such
that the partial of effect of θ on y is equal to 1).7 Now, even if we can assume that ǫijk
is mean independent of (x, z, r), identification of the compensating wage differential δ is
only achieved if the unobserved effect θ is also mean independent of (x, z, r). Whenever
there is reason to believe otherwise, parameter δ is not identified (and neither are the
other parameters identified, but that is of minor importance for our purposes, since we
are not per se interested in these parameters).
As discussed in section 4.2, the leading reason for a correlation between θ and the
accident risk r is that θ reflects unobserved productivity, which is obviously related to
the wage y. If the demand for safety actually increases with income and if we are, at
6Many, if not most, other empirical studies face the same problem of not observing the relevant risk
measure over time, as pointed out by Hwang et al.: ”While studies of this sort [i.e. panel studies] represent
improvements over standard cross–sectional studies, their applicability is restricted by the availability of
longitudinal data sets that include the relevant nonwage job attribute variables. In most cases, this is a
binding constraint.” (Hwang et al., 1992, p. 836).
7Note that the error term ǫijk potentially also includes unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the
firm. We will take up this issue in section 4.4.4 below.
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the same time, unable to adequately control for productivity differences, then this could
quite plausibly lead to a correlation between θ and r. That is, more productive workers
(i.e. workers with above–average θ) sort themselves into less–risky jobs by accepting lower
wages, which in turn leads to a correlation between the productivity measure θ and the
risk measure r, meaning that identification of the risk compensation parameter δ must
ultimately fail.
In the following, we will discuss three different empirical approaches in turn, all of
which are intended to mitigate the worker–sorting leading to biased estimates of the
compensation for risk.
4.4.2 Control Function
The first approach, which we might label control–function approach, is to basically stick
with the hedonic wage regression, but to try to control for as many observable charac-
teristics (both at the individual and the firm/job level) as possible. In fact, controlling
for the appropriate set of observed variables might entail identification of δ, depending
on which variables are observed, and thus can be controlled for in the regression model.
Under ’typical’ circumstances however, this approach is prone to fail identification, since
the data sources usually available do not include enough control variables or the critical
control variables, respectively. Nonetheless, we will also estimate hedonic wage regres-
sions, mainly for reasons of comparison. We stress here that we would not place much
confidence in the resulting estimates for the parameter δ. The bottom line is that this
approach to identification crucially hinges on the availability of enough control variables
(describing both the workers and the jobs).
4.4.3 Sample Stratification
A second related approach is to stratify the sample in such a way as to minimize the
variation in the unobserved error component θ (see equation (4.3)). That is, we run the
very same hedonic wage regression as given by equation (4.1), but only on a narrow subset
of individuals. Ideally, this subset consists of individuals presumably as similar as possible
with respect to θ. That is, stratification is the simple non–parametric counterpart of the
control function approach. However, since most often it is very difficult to control for θ,
we think that stratifying the sample is probably a more fruitful approach.
Our stratification variable of primary interest is the skill–level of the job, which is
recorded in the SWSS. Let sij ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} be the skill–level of individual i working in job
j, where s = 1 (s = 4) corresponds to the highest (lowest) skill–level of a given job. We
thus run the same hedonic wage regression as in equation (4.1), but only on a subset of
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individuals within a given skill–level s. Specifically, we will run the following regressions:




jγ + δrk + uijk sij ≥ s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (4.4)
Note that this approach to estimation is basically the same as the control function ap-
proach, the main difference being that stratification allows all parameter estimates to
vary between different subsets of the sample8. However, we think it plausible that the
main advantage of the stratification is that we can minimize variation in θ in this way,
which ideally renders a consistent estimate of the compensating wage differential δ.9
4.4.4 Wage Decomposition and Firm Wage–Component
Our third approach to identification and estimation is based on quite another idea, which
tries to capitalize on the availability of panel data (with respect to the firm).10 Still, we
can use the additional source of variation in wages stemming from the fact that the SWSS
has a longitudinal structure (at least with respect to the firm) such that we can apply
simple panel data methods (see, for example, Wooldridge, 2002).
To start with, let us assume that the observed natural logarithm of the wage yit of
individual i in a given year t can (conceptually) be decomposed in a linear model as
follows:
yijt = λt + φi + ψj + ǫijt (4.5)
Abstracting from the time fixed–effect λt, equation (4.5) states that individual i’s wage is
the sum of an individual wage fixed–effect φi, a firm wage fixed–effect ψj , and a remaining
random error component ǫijt. The critical assumptions in this simple linear fixed effects
model are the assumptions about the time invariance of both the individual and the firm
fixed effect. However, since we are using panel data spanning only a short time period we
believe that these assumptions are innocuous for our application – nonetheless allowing
us to resort to the power of panel data methods. Importantly, note that the theory of
8That is, the control function approach yields the same estimates as sample stratification if all pa-
rameters would be interacted with the variable on which stratification is based on. However, such a fully
interacted regression model is, due to the large number of parameters to be estimated, often difficult to
interpret.
9As we will show later, our stratification approach actually reduces the differences between groups of
workers with respect to the observed wage (on this point, see table 4.5). For example, in the overall sample
the difference in mean monthly earnings between men and women amounts to about 1,700 Swiss francs
(about one third relative to the female average). In the subsample of workers within the lowest skill–level,
the difference in average earnings amounts to only about 630 Swiss francs (relative to the female average,
a bit less than 15%). Although this is only suggestive evidence, we still believe that this exactly what one
would expect if the presumption holds that the variance in θ is lower in the lower skill–levels of jobs.
10Of course, we could capitalize on repeated individual observations using for example the techniques
proposed by Abowd and Kramarz (1999), but as explained in section 4.3, we only have temporal infor-
mation about the employer but not the individual workers.
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compensating wage differentials essentially makes statements about the wage component
specific to the employer (i.e. ψj), but not to the individual–specific part nor the random
part of the wage.
This simple representation of the wage essentially states that the wage of a specific
individual i in a given year t is the sum of an aggregate time effect (e.g. aggregate shocks),
an individual–specific component (which is assumed to be time–invariant), a firm–specific
part (also assumed to be time–invariant) and a random error term (varying over time,
firms, and individuals). If it is possible to consistently estimate the wage firm fixed effect
ψj from the available data, we can essentially get rid of individual heterogeneity by simply
running a hedonic wage regressing using the estimated wage firm–fixed effect ψ̂j instead
of the observed wage yijt on our risk measure r, although we can not directly control for
unobserved individual heterogeneity in the hedonic wage regression (because, remember,
the risk measure is not observed over time and because there is no person–identifier in
the SWSS).
Thus, in a first stage, we run a simple regression model using the three consecutive
waves of the SWSS:




jtγ + λt + ψj + uijt with sij = 4 (4.6)
Here, again, x and z are vectors of observed individual and firm characteristics and
the parameter λt captures aggregate wage shifts over time. The vector x of observed
individual characteristics is important here because we essentially use x to proxy for
otherwise unobserved individual heterogeneity. Moreover, we run this regression on a
subset of individuals working in jobs with the lowest skill–level only, such that we can
further dampen the problem of unobserved heterogeneity.
The regression model given by equation (4.6) is only of interest here because it allows
us to estimate the firm wage fixed effects, represented by the vector ψj . Practically, ψj
is estimated from the data by including a separate dummy variable for each firm in the
sample.
In the second stage, we run a regression very similar to the hedonic model from
equation (4.1):




jγ + rkδ + uijk with sij = 4 (4.7)
where now the dependent variable is the estimated firm wage fixed effect ψ̂ijk of individual
i working in firm j. Note that the unit of observation is still the individual worker,
although the firm fixed effect obviously does not vary between individuals working in the
same firm. This procedure, though, directly applies the right weighting scheme. Again,
rk is the non–fatal risk measure in industry×skill–level cell k. Note that we still have
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to include both vector x and z, because the estimated wage firm fixed effect ψ̂ is not
independent of x and z. The main point is that the estimated wage firm fixed effect ψ̂
should have been separated from the unobserved individual–specific component θ.
4.5 Econometric Results
We now present the econometric results, starting with some simple hedonic wage re-
gressions. We then go to discuss the results from stratifying the sample by skill–level,
which yields results in the expected direction. Next, we present results from our preferred
approach, regressing firm wage fixed–effects instead of individual wage on accident risk.
Finally, we present empirical estimates for the statistical value of a injury (i.e. a non–fatal
accident related to workplace activities), which are implicitly given by the estimates of
the different econometric models.
4.5.1 Hedonic Wage Regression
Estimated parameters of the hedonic wage function, as given by equation (4.1), are given
in table 4.2 (column 1). The point estimate of the non–fatal accident risk is negative
(-0.00005), although statistically not different from zero (t–value of about less than one
in absolute value). This result is in fact in line with either endogenous sorting of workers.
Note also that the other regressors have the expected sign. As discussed in section 4.4,
the leading explanation for the ”wrong” sign of the risk variable is endogenous sorting of
workers into jobs with different risks. As we do not put much confidence in this simple
hedonic wage regression, so we quickly move on to the next results.
4.5.2 Sample Stratification
Columns 2 to 4 in table 4.2 also show parameter estimates from a simple hedonic wage
regression, but only for a subset of workers each. As we narrow the range of the skill–level,
the point estimate of risk compensation moves towards the expected direction. Focusing
on workers in the lowest skill–level only yields a positive point estimate on the risk measure
(0.00024), which moreover is almost statistically significant on the 10% level (t–value of
1.63). The decrease in the R–squared of the model reflects the fact that the stratification
of the sample absorbs a large part of the variation in the regressors (e.g. educational
attainment; see section 4.3), which otherwise explain a significant part of the variation in
wages.
4.5.3 Wage Firm Fixed Effects
The last column in table A.1 in the chapter appendix shows the estimated firm wage
fixed–effect by industry (at the two–digit level, only for the lowest skill–level of jobs). As
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shown in figure 4.2, a simple scatterplot of the average firm wage fixed–effect (averaged
within industries) versus the number of non–fatal accidents now shows a clear positive
relation between the two variables (as opposed to figure 4.1, which showed no relation
between the two measures at all). A simple regression of the average wage firm fixed
effect on the number of non–fatal accidents yields an estimated slope coefficient of 0.0034,
which marginally reaches statistical significance (t–value of about 1.6). Column 1 of table
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Non fatal accidents for 1,000 workers
beta = .0034 ; t−value = 1.6
Notes: The y–axis shows the average of the wage firm fixed effect and the x–
axis the number of non–fatal accidents per 1,000 workers per year. Workers in
lowest job skill–level only. Also see table A.1 in the chapter appendix. Own
calculations, based on SWSS (2004) and SAIF (2004).
4.3 reproduces, for the purpose of comparison, the simple hedonic wage regression using
workers from the lowest skill-level only (see section 4.5.1 above). As it turns out (see
column 2, table 4.3), the point estimate of the risk parameter more then doubles when
using ψ̂ instead of y directly as the dependent variable in the regression, yielding a point
estimate of 0.00067 (with a t–value of more than 2). This result is in line with the story
of workers sorting into jobs based on their (partially) unobserved productivity, because
the main difference between columns 1 and 2 of table 4.3 is that variation in y still reflects
to a large part variation in unobserved productivity, whereas variation in ψ̂ much less so.
4.5.4 Detailed Results
We present some additional results for different subgroups of the sample, based on both
the simple hedonic wage model and on models using the wage firm fixed effect as the
dependent variable. The estimates of these additional models are given in table 4.4.
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Table 4.3: Observed wage versus wage firm fixed effect (skill–level 4 only)
ln(monthly wage)
Observed wage (y) Firm fixed effect (ψ̂)
Non fatal accident risk 0.00024 0.00067⋆
(1.63) (2.41)
(Plant size / 100) 0.00148⋆ 0.00189⋆
(2.16) (2.10)




Age squared −0.00019⋆⋆⋆ −0.00005⋆
(−9.18) (−2.68)
(Tenure / 10) 0.11261⋆⋆⋆ 0.03799⋆⋆
(6.65) (2.80)






Notes: ⋆, ⋆⋆, ⋆⋆⋆ denotes statistical significance on the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level, respec-
tively. Robust t-values in parentheses. Only workers in jobs of lowest skill–level. Own
calculations, based on SWSS (2004) and SAIF (2004).
These additional estimates are consistent with our main result, since in each case the
model using the wage firm fixed effect as the dependent variable yields a higher risk
compensation than using the observed wage. Panel A of table 4.4 simply reproduces the
result from table 4.3 discussed above for easy comparison with the other results.
Additionally, these estimates may shed some light on the question of the sorting of
workers into firms with different risk compensation and possibly on differences in risk
aversion between groups of workers.11 Note that, by construction, the estimated firm
wage fixed effect ψ̂ijk is the same for all individuals working within a specific firm j.
It thus must be the case that differences in the estimated risk compensation between
subgroups of workers somehow reflect differences in risk compensation between firms. We
will be more explicit on this point below when discussing the results.
First, we split the sample by gender (panel B of table 4.4). The hedonic wage model
gives positive point estimates for both men and women, although both are not statistically
different from zero. Interestingly, the point estimate of the compensating wage differential
11We also split the sample by marital status (i.e. married versus single individuals). We did not find
(statistically) different results and we thus do not present these results.
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is larger for women (δ̂ = 0.00046) than for men (δ̂ = 0.00015). Using the wage firm fixed
effect yields, in both cases, a higher point estimate than using the observed wage (δ̂ =
0.00038 for men, and δ̂ = 0.0015 for women), but now in this case both coefficients are
statistically different from zero. Still, the estimate for women remains about three times
as large as the corresponding estimate for men.
We believe that such a pattern is informative with respect to the underlying sorting
of workers into firms with different risk compensation. The results essentially state that
women ask a higher risk compensation than men for a given change in the statistical
non–fatal accident risk. This result is in line with empirical evidence on differences in risk
aversion between men and women (Sunden and Surette, 1998).
Second, table 4.4 (panel C) also shows separate results for smaller (that is, less than 500
employees) and larger (500 or more employees) firms. The simple hedonic wage regression
for smaller firms gives us a positive and significant point estimate for risk compensation
(δ̂=0.00031, t–value of about 3.3). For larger firms, we find no effect of accident risk on
the firm wage fixed effect (the point estimate is even negative). Moving on to the fixed
Table 4.4: Wage firm fixed effects, detailed results
Log–Wage Firm fixed effect













C. By size of firm








Notes: ⋆, ⋆⋆, ⋆⋆⋆ denotes statistical significance on the 5%, 1% and 0.1%
level, respectively. Robust t-values in parentheses. Own calculations,
based on SWSS (2004) and SAIF (2004).
84
4.5. Econometric Results Compensating Wage Differentials
effects regression, we again get a larger point estimate for the smaller firms (δ̂ = 0.0007,
t–value of about 3.4) and larger firms (δ̂ = 0.00055), although for larger firms the estimate
remains statistically insignificant.
This result states that smaller firms have to pay higher risk compensation for any
increase in the risk of non–fatal accident than larger firms do. This difference in risk
compensation might reflect underlying differences in the wage setting process between
firms of different size. Specifically, one might argue that wages in smaller firms are more
likely to reflect competitive wages than in larger firms, where rent sharing is presumably
more prevalent than in smaller firms. Another possible explanation for this finding is that
workers may perceive working at larger firms per se as more safe (for whatever reason).
In statistical terms, in fact, larger firms do not pay any risk compensation at all, which
possibly means that larger firms have to guarantee workplace safety anyway because they
are presumably under stricter monitoring, whereas smaller firms have more discretion
with respect to workplace safety and thus to risk compensation.
4.5.5 The Value of a Statistical Injury
Given an estimate for the compensation for non–fatal accident risk, we can easily compute
the value of a statistical injury (i.e. non–fatal accident). Because all our estimates of the
risk parameter are based on semi–logarithmic regressions, the estimated risk coefficient
corresponds to the relative wage which 1,000 workers are willing to forego in order to
prevent one non–fatal accident (and thus is independent of the time period chosen). Thus,
multiplying the estimated risk parameter by 1,000 yields the estimated relative value of
a statistical injury (VSI):
VSI = δ̂ · 1, 000 (4.8)
Since our risk measure refers to non–fatal accident per year, we will phrase the VSI in
terms of average annual earnings (that is, we multiply VSI additionally with the average
annual earnings in the corresponding group of workers). Table 4.5 shows estimates for
the value of a statistical injury computed from the different estimation methods discussed
above (given in terms of the average annual earnings in the sample). The main estimates
are based on the point estimate of the risk variable. Lower and upper bounds on the value
of a statistical injury are based on the 95% confidence interval of each point estimate of
the parameter δ. The simple hedonic wage regression actually yields a negative estimate
for the value of a statistical injury (per injury per year). Only using the upper bound of
the confidence interval yields the expected positive value (although still small).
Stratification of the sample yields a higher value of a statistical injury, the narrower
the sample. Focusing on workers in the lowest skill–level only gives an estimate of about
14,000 Swiss francs (the estimate based on the lower bound of the confidence interval
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though still gives a negative estimate).
Using the wage firm fixed effect finally gives a consistent positive value of a statistical
injury (even if we use the lower bound of the corresponding confidence interval). Using
the point estimate, we get an estimated value of a statistical injury of about 40,000 Swiss
francs per non–fatal accident averted per year. This value fits into the range reported by
most other studies (see Viscusi and Aldy, 2003, again).
4.6 Conclusions
We provide empirical estimates of the value of a statistical injury for Switzerland for
the year 2004, using non–fatal accident risk within industry×skill–level cells and apply-
ing different approaches to identification. Specifically, we try to statistically isolate the
firm–specific wage component, to which the theory of compensating wage differentials con-
ceptually applies most directly. Further, we try to mitigate the problem of endogenous
worker sorting as far as possible by combining appropriate data and methods.
The empirical method actually makes a huge difference with respect to the estimation
of risk compensation. Simple hedonic wage regressions actually yield negative or zero
compensation for non–fatal accident risk at the workplace. Moving on to methods we
believe are more reliable (i.e. consistent) pushes the risk compensation in the ”right”
direction (i.e. yielding positive compensation for accident risk). Our preferred estimation
method, based on a restricted sample of workers in jobs of lowest skill–level only and
using the wage firm fixed effect instead of the observed wage, gives an estimate for the
value of a statistical injury of about 40,000 Swiss francs, which is within the range given
by both studies from inside and outside the U.S. labor market.
Our analysis, by comparing the magnitude of risk compensation, may also shed
some light on the problem of endogenous sorting of workers based on their (unobserved)
productivity–relevant characteristics. The more attention we pay to mitigating unob-
served productivity differences, the larger the estimates for risk compensation we get.
This pattern seems to be consistent with the hypothesis that high–productivity workers
select into lower–risk jobs by accepting lower wages.
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4.A Appendix
Table A.1: Main variables, by industry (lowest skill–level only)
Industry Workers Earnings Accidents FFE
Petroleum refining and processing 4692 5,560.13 0.14 0.78
Office material production, data processing 4288 4,302.83 0.59 -0.62
Information technology services 6237 3,933.30 2.39 -0.76
Shipping 55 5,467.47 3.57 0.96
Metal production and processing 7201 4,781.81 5.46 -0.53
Aviation 12 5,496.25 6.22 -0.44
Production of leather goods and shoes 229 3,628.01 8.94 -1.57
Production of clothes and fur goods 270 3,741.27 9.89 -1.87
Insurance industry 2086 5,300.57 10.53 1.38
Production of medical technology 7421 4,523.07 11.55 -0.26
Retail business 19118 4,090.10 12.26 -0.22
Tobacco processing 636 5,977.87 12.70 3.61
Production of furniture, jewellery, musical intruments 1743 4,329.91 14.86 -0.27
Machinery/mechanical engineering 5441 4,851.64 20.24 -0.07
Textiles 1350 4,436.00 20.83 -0.73
Automobile industry 1075 4,508.15 22.73 -0.39
Energy– and watersupply 496 5,504.46 25.59 1.79
Traffic support 1502 4,360.78 26.35 -0.53
Credit business 3059 5,833.48 28.60 0.91
Paper and carton production 2153 4,917.06 29.64 -0.22
Credit business and insurance industry 70 5,373.94 29.76 0.86
Printing, publishing and distribution industries 3013 4,833.14 36.99 -0.21
Research and development 202 5,478.94 39.78 1.34
Whole sale 7621 4,683.02 41.36 -0.34
Wood processing 810 4,950.09 43.53 0.11
Transportation 2236 4,724.08 46.89 -0.29
Rubber and plastic production 2657 4,511.65 48.12 -0.60
Mining 80 5,277.08 50.33 2.03
Agriculture 6756 4,310.73 57.05 -0.96
Mining 1217 4,821.76 59.91 -0.26
Health and welfare system 19642 4,582.02 65.31 0.92
Hotel and restaurant industry 9676 3,743.90 76.98 -0.01
Real estate 581 4,784.07 95.10 0.69
Information transmission 55 4,707.71 111.04 0.05
Entertainment 814 4,208.07 113.46 -0.44
Education 744 4,394.47 221.19 0.64
Personal services 238 4,318.43 233.62 2.31
Waste management 95 4,953.19 242.00 0.37
Lobby, associations, organizations 512 5,067.35 264.88 1.22
Construction 4893 4,965.64 289.03 0.25
Notes: Table entries show sample averages within industries. Non–fatal accident risk is the number of non–fatal
accidents per 1,000 workers. Wage is the average logarithm of gross monthly earnings. Wage firm fixed effect is
the average firm fixed effect, as given by equation (4.6), and is (in the table) standardized to mean 0 and variance
1. Own calculations, based on SWSS and SIAF.
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”La statistique: une personne complaisante qui ne
refuse rien de ce qu’on lui demande habilement.”
Edouard Herriot (1872-1957), French politician
As pointed out by Edouard Herriot, statistics is like a compliant person who refuses
nothing that is cleverly requested. Nevertheless, the explanatory power of statistics is
limited by the available data. The data preparation was not only the most time-consuming
part of this thesis but also the cornerstone of the entire analysis. Chapter 2 and 3 are
based on Austrian data, whereas chapter 4 uses Swiss data.
Chapter 2 deals solely with the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), a large ad-
ministrative longitudinal data set. The data has been kindly provided by the ”Hauptver-
band der österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger”. The data was originally collected
to calculate old age social security benefits and covers the universe of all private sector
workers from 1972 to 2002. The unusually long observation period has allowed me to an-
alyze long term earnings losses of workers displaced due to a plant closure at two different
points in the business cycle. I could furthermore separate workers displaced from small
firms from workers displaced from large firms, because workers and firms are linked in
the ASSD. For this chapter the data preparation was of crucial importance. All of the
results are dependent on how one defines a plant closure firm. Therefore, I have attached
great importance to a very accurate definition of a firm going bankrupt. This is essential
in order to exclude as many differences between boom and recession as possible. I was
able to shed new light on a very special, but in my opinion very interesting, puzzle in the
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literature on earnings losses of displaced workers. Results indicate that workers displaced
from a small firm in a economic situation which is getting better and better are some-
how labeled as less productive and receive lower wages than workers displaced from small
firms during a recession or those displaced from large firms no matter what the economic
climate.
Chapter 3 complements the ASSD with data from the Austrian statutory accident
insurance, reporting the complete history of workplace accidents from 2000 to 2002. This
data has been kindly provided by the ”Österreichische Allgemeine Unfallversicherungsanstalt”
(AUVA). The two data sets can be linked via the individuals’ anonymous social security
number. This allows us not only to split observed wages into a firm-wage component
and a worker wage component, but also to split observed injuries into a part attached
to the worker and a part specific to the firm. In doing so we can identify the building
block of the theory by regressing the firm wage component on the firm risk component.
Our results show that high productive workers do not sort themselves into low risk jobs,
therefore we can show that the bias obtained from standard cross-section hedonic wage
regressions is rather small. But we do find that conditional on firm risk, high risk workers
sort themselves into high risk jobs.
Chapter 4 uses data from two sources. First, the ”Schweizerische Unfallversicherungs
Anstalt” (Suva) provided us with the number of non–fatal accidents within industry×skill–
level cells. Second, the ”Bundesamt für Statistik” (BfS) provided us with data including
individual monthly earnings and several individual–specific and firm–specific characteris-
tics. The advantage of the Swiss data is that accidents are recorded separately for four
different skill levels of workers, which allowed us to focus on workers in the lowest skill
level. A further advantage is that the data includes, beside many other individual specific
characteristics, the educational level of all workers. The preferred point estimate uses in
this chapter for the compensating wage differential corresponds to a value of a statistical
accident of 40,000 Swiss francs. Further we were able to show that women demand a
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